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The merits of greater or lesser net price transparency (NPT) has been a topic for discussion for 
many years across business and industry in general. However, in the past few years, the debate 
on NPT of innovative medicines has intensified, with organisations such as the United Nations (UN), 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) leading calls for greater transparency in the pharmaceutical sector, 
specifically focused on prices. In May 2019 the World Health Assembly (WHA) approved a 
resolution to support the greater public disclosure of prices and research and development (R&D) 
costs for both medicines and other health products supported by several European and non-
European governments. To contribute to the international debate on the transparency of medicine 
prices in Europe, Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD) asked Charles River Associates (CRA) to curate a 
panel of experts to develop evidence on the impact of greater NPT of innovative medicines. 
Professor Walter Van Dyck1 and Professor Massimo Riccaboni2 were asked by CRA to lead this 
research, supported by a wider panel of 10 experts from a range of European markets.  
A structured literature review was first conducted to summarise the theoretical consequences of 
greater NPT. This was supplemented with a survey of national payers and payer experts3 from a 
range of European markets. This was used as pre-read information for an expert advisory board of 
12 economic and health economic experts representing 12 countries selected to give a range of 
market sizes, national income and payer approaches. The debate and the consensus reached by 
the advisory board have been summarised in this report. In addition, a computational model has 
been developed by two key investigators to provide new, empirical evidence to illustrate the impact 
of NPT on different European markets.4 
 
Putting the ‘net price transparency’ debate into context 
There is a need for clarity on the definition of ‘net price transparency’, and in particular to 
distinguish this from the concept of ‘pricing transparency’ or ‘pricing process transparency’ (Table 
1). It is generally agreed that transparency in decision-making (pricing process transparency) is 
beneficial to the functioning of the innovative pharmaceutical market as it supports good 
governance, enhanced decision-making and efficiency. The disclosure of net prices of innovative 
medicines (NPT) is a different debate. Greater NPT, referring to the disclosure of nationally agreed 
ex-factory prices (which are currently confidential in most European markets), has myriad potential 
economic ramifications that could significantly affect patients, payers and the industry. Some 
experts have suggested that instead of looking for greater price transparency, markets that do not 
                                                 
1  Associate Professor of Technology & Innovation Management, Vlerick Business School, Belgium 
2  Professor of Economics; AXES Research Unit at IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca, Italy 
3  National payers and payer advisors were representatives of the national public body responsible for HTA and/or pricing 
decisions. 
4  Van Dyck, W., Riccaboni, M., & Swoboda, T. 2020. Pharmaceutical net price transparency across European markets: 
Insights from a Multi-Agent simulation model, Vlerick Policy Paper Series #13. Brussels, Belgium: Healthcare Management 
Centre, Vlerick Business School. 
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have effective pricing process transparency measures should focus on this to ensure they are not 
overpaying for medicines from a local value perspective. 
Table 1: Definition of ‘pricing transparency’ vs ‘price transparency’ 
Pricing process transparency 
Transparency of the process used to decide prices, aiming 




Transparency of the final ex-factory price level agreed 
between national payers and manufacturers, aiming to 
disclose any preferential rebates a payer may have achieved 
Source: CRA 
 
Calls for greater NPT should also be accompanied by more clarity on how to overcome 
practical challenges. For example, while there is often a price agreed between the manufacturer 
and the relevant national authority, this is rarely the price paid for an innovative medicine or the 
amount of money that the manufacturer receives. We note that there are many different prices 
associated to a single medicine: for example, there is the list price publicly disclosed by the 
manufacturer, the price including distribution margins and taxes, and several prices agreed with the 
national payer taking into account rebates, discounts, outcome-based payments and clawbacks. 
Further to this, the price can also vary depending on whether a product goes through a regional 
process or is subsequently negotiated at the hospital level. Calls for greater NPT also tend not to 
address other practical challenges flagged by experts during discussion, including the methods of 
information sharing (e.g. the channels through which the information is shared, who is responsible 
for sharing information and with whom the information should be shared) and how to account for 
current legislation that protects the confidentiality of pricing agreements.  
 
The political view is not always fully aligned with payers regarding the 
consequences of NPT on national budgets 
While many policymakers and payers express support for the concept of greater NPT, 
payers recognise the potential negative consequences of greater NPT without appropriate 
contingency measures. The views of many policymakers (which are made public and widely 
reported by the media) are largely supportive of greater NPT. This appears to be due to concerns 
around the prices of innovative medicines and perceptions of excessive profitability, together with 
a historically low level of trust in the pharmaceutical industry. The views of those responsible for 
negotiating prices on behalf of public health systems (payers) are less clear; therefore a survey 
with current and former payers and payer advisors was conducted to provide a basic understanding 
of these views. Insights from the payer survey indicated a more complex picture than is seen in the 
public domain for policymakers: although payers were generally supportive of greater NPT, 
expectations about the impact on price level varied significantly, and very few respondents indicated 
that they would expect any positive impact on patient access (Figure 1). Qualitative insights 
indicated that there were a number of drivers behind payer support of greater NPT. Firstly, survey 
respondents reported that there is a general attitude amongst payers to favour transparency, which 
is a concept with predominantly positive connotations. And secondly, payers tend to support equity 
across all European markets (whereas currently some are more transparent than others). Despite 
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this, results from the survey also indicated that payers have concerns about making their own prices 
transparent, underpinned by their belief that confidentiality allows for better prices to be achieved. 
Figure 1: Payer expectations about the impact of greater NPT on net price levels and patient 
access (n = 16) 
 
*Other: Respondents indicated that (a) they could not predict the outcome or (b) there would be a mix of outcomes (e.g. 
both higher and lower prices) dependent on current price levels and product characteristics. 
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020)5 
 
There appears to be consensus that greater NPT will result in price convergence due to the 
frequent use of international reference pricing (IRP) mechanisms across European markets. In an 
environment where negotiators are able to reference prices in other markets, sellers would be more 
likely to offer all buyers similar prices in an effort to avoid a downward pricing spiral.6 There is some 
evidence to support this from other industries and through economic simulations that model 
increased transparency; for example, a recent simulation conducted for the medical devices space 
highlighted that all transparency measures resulted in the restricted ability of suppliers to sell at 
different prices to different hospitals.7 As a first consequence, greater NPT would therefore lead to 
more uniform prices. 
It is also likely that price convergence will disproportionately affect lower-income markets. 
Although it is difficult to observe with any precision, the evidence suggests prices reflect affordability 
                                                 
5  CRA Payer Survey. Q2: “What do you expect to happen (i.e. not what you would like to happen) to the prices of innovative 
medicines in your market, if the level of price transparency is increased in all European markets, including yours (so the 
confidential prices negotiated in your market are known to others) and, at the same time, assuming that pharmaceutical 
companies would strategically react to the disclosure of confidential agreements?”. Q3: What do you expect to happen (i.e. 
not what you would like to happen) to the time to access innovative medicines in your market, if: the level of price 
transparency is increased in all European markets, including yours (so the confidential prices negotiated in your market are 
known to others) and, at the same time, assuming that pharmaceutical companies would strategically react to the disclosure 
of confidential agreements?”. 
6  Kyle, M.K. & Ridley, D.B. (2007). “Would Greater Transparency and Uniformity of Health Care prices Benefit Poor Patients?”. 
Health Affairs, 26 (5): 1384–1391. DOI 10.1377/hlthaff.26.5.1384 
7  Grennan, M. (2013). “Price Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices”. American Economic 























Q2: Expected impact on Net Price Levels Q3: Expected impact on Access
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(as predicted by economic theory – Ramsey Pricing – and Differential Pricing principles).8 With 
price convergence, economic theory dictates that innovative medicine prices in markets that are 
paying below the European average will increase, while they could decrease in markets paying 
above the European average, typically the higher-income countries.9 As found in the computational 
model (Figure 2), lower-income markets could expect price increases under transparent conditions, 
whereas higher-income and low-volume markets could expect price decreases. At the extreme, 
some markets could see their prices increase by as much as 60%. It is also important to note that 
in cases where Ramsey pricing is not being adhered to (i.e. lower-income markets are paying more 
than higher-income markets), greater NPT might result in this situation being addressed, or at the 
very least changed so that prices are converged. 
Figure 2: Normalised price change under NPT in selected European markets – a prediction 
from a simulation model 
  
Source: Van Dyck, W., Riccaboni, M., & Swoboda, T. 2020. Pharmaceutical net price transparency across European 
markets: Insights from a Multi-Agent simulation model, Vlerick Policy Paper Series #13. Brussels, Belgium: Healthcare 
Management Centre, Vlerick Business School. 
 
Greater NPT is expected to alter the functioning of the market for innovative 
medicines 
                                                 
8  Schweitzer, S.O. & Comanor, W.S. (2011). “Prices Of Pharmaceuticals In Poor Countries Are Much Lower Than In Wealthy 
Countries”. Health Affairs, 30 (8) 
9  Given the currently confidential nature of innovative medicine pricing, the computational model considers that the value-
based price (i.e. price obtained without transparency/under normal conditions) is the average of the published list prices for 
a selection of innovative medicines over the period 1996–2008 with a normalised, average confidential rebate of 30% 
uniformly set for all countries. The model also assumes that in a transparent system, all markets will want to reference the 
lowest transparent price. See Van Dyck, W., Riccaboni, M., & Swoboda, T. 2020. Pharmaceutical net price transparency 
across European markets: Insights from a Multi-Agent simulation model, Vlerick Policy Paper Series #13. Brussels, Belgium: 
Healthcare Management Centre, Vlerick Business School for model details and robustness checks. 
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The use of IRP for price determination would increase with greater NPT, likely at the expense 
of health technology assessment (HTA) approaches. With greater emphasis during the price 
negotiation process being given to international medicine prices, the role of HTA in influencing 
pricing decisions is likely to change. As a result, greater NPT is expected to facilitate a shift away 
from value-based pricing (VBP) mechanisms that rely heavily on HTA and instead toward IRP 
mechanisms. Experts part of the advisory board also highlighted that this shift in price determination 
methodology could result in a situation where payers choose to determine innovative medicine 
prices based on whichever method allows them to achieve greater price reductions. In this situation, 
there is a danger that price setting becomes more delinked from the value a medicine delivers in a 
particular market, and also that the decision-making process behind pricing decisions becomes 
less transparent. Further to this, increased reliance on IRP ignores any differences in product use 
across markets and the differential value that one product can have in different markets (e.g. an 
anti-infective that is used in reserve in one market but needed earlier in the treatment paradigm in 
another due to higher epidemiology of resistant infections). 
Experts also theorised that with greater NPT, some European markets would attempt to form 
coalitions and cross-country collaborations to put themselves in stronger negotiating 
positions and increase their bargaining power. Already, there are examples of cross-country 
collaborations across Europe applied to HTAs, reimbursement decisions and procurement, 
although none are used consistently for all medicine approvals (e.g. the BeNeLuxA-I coalition and 
the Valletta Declaration group). In theory these collaborations can be used to positive effect in the 
case of innovative medicines, particularly advanced therapy medicinal products (ATMPs), 
improving efficiency in assessment processes and decreasing time to access, but little empirical 
evidence of this currently exists. In an environment of greater transparency, countries could be 
forced to explore these alternative approaches more seriously as tools to gain efficient access to 
innovative medicines.10 
An increase in NPT could in some cases lead to the misuse of pricing mechanisms. It has 
been suggested that markets may increasingly attempt to use complicated performance-based 
managed entry agreements (MEAs) to achieve an unobservable, ex-post discount. Today, MEAs 
are used for a variety of reasons, including providing financial discounts to payers but also providing 
more certainty to physicians and payers on the clinical impacts and/or cost-effectiveness (CE) of 
medicines.11 The greater use of performance-based MEAs in order to circumvent requirements on 
NPT would be inefficient and not in line with the intended purpose of such agreements. In addition, 
markets with a lack of infrastructure or a lack of experience in implementing more sophisticated 
payment models could be unfairly disadvantaged by this misuse of MEAs since they will not have 
the same capabilities to achieve these proxy confidential discounts. 
Greater NPT could adversely affect competition in the pharmaceutical market. The role of 
transparency in competition has been examined by academic and competition authorities.12 It is 
important to notice the role that the degree of market concentration plays in the negative impact of 
increased price transparency: in more competitive markets, price transparency can deliver benefits 
                                                 
10  EFPIA (2019). “Policy Principles on Cross-country Collaborations on Medicines’ Pricing and Access”. Available at 
https://www.efpia.eu/media/412513/policy-principles-on-cross-country-collaborations-on-medicines-pricing-and-access.pdf  
11  Klemp, M. and Frønsdal, K.B. (2011). “What principles should govern the use of managed entry agreements?” International 
Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care, 27(1):77-83.  
12  Austin, A., & Gravelle, J. (2007). “Does Price Transparency Improve Market Efficiency? Implications of Empirical Evidence 
in Other Markets for the Health Sector.” Congressional Research Service. 
The consequences of greater net price transparency for innovative medicines in Europe: searching for a 
consensus 
  
December 2020  
 
 
  Page x 
 
to consumers in terms of increased competition; this has been the case, for instance, with digital 
platforms for online purchases. However, in industries facing a certain degree of market 
concentration (such as the innovative pharmaceutical industry), experience has shown that greater 
NPT can facilitate collusive behaviours, ultimately leading to higher prices. Further to this, greater 
NPT can be seen to disincentivise increased competition within a therapy area which could 
subsequently result in less pricing pressure on innovative products. Competition within a non-
transparent market has frequently led to decreases in price and overall spending, for example in 
the case of Hepatitis C, where intense competition led to sharp decreases in prices and overall 
spending.13,14 Lastly, reduced competition following the implementation of price transparency 
measures has been seen in other industries, and although the pharmaceutical market is different, 
and lessons from other industries should be used with care, they should not be ignored. 
 
The impact of NPT on patient access to innovative medicines 
Access delays are likely and would be expected to affect patients in lower-income markets 
disproportionately. The presence of IRP mechanisms provides incentives for payers to delay price 
negotiations until prices in other markets are available. This also incentivises manufacturers to 
launch drugs in an order that will protect their prices.15,16 This occurs today, but NPT would amplify 
these incentives, thus increasing the potential access delays faced by markets with a lower price 
potential and, as predicted by the computational model, also in countries with a middle-level price.17 
In these markets, it may be neither affordable for payers to agree to a higher price for a medicine 
nor possible for the industry to sustainably offer a lower price even if they wish to launch there (as 
illustrated in Figure 3). This may mean that pricing agreements in lower-income markets (vs 
highest-income markets) cannot be reached for several years until price erosion (e.g. caused by 
competitor entry in other markets) has brought the price to a level where they are able to pay.  
Access delays are also likely to be largest for the most innovative products. There are a 
number of reasons why the value delivered by the most innovative medicines is likely to vary across 
countries (due to need for complementary healthcare infrastructure and diagnosis, for example). 
The asymmetry between the value and the volumes in the lower-income markets and higher-
income markets is likely to be larger for these products. So, any impact of NPT will be exaggerated 
(given the commercial incentives to secure access in the higher-value/higher-volume markets). In 
this case, we might expect NPT to have a very strong impact on patient access, increasing the 
significant differences in access we already observe today. By this theory it is also true that for non- 
                                                 
13  Roediger, A., Wilsdon, T., Haderi, A., Pendleton, K. and Azais, B. (2019). “Competition between on-patent medicines in 
Europe”. Available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168851019301289  
14  Hawkes, N. (2019). “NHS England finalises procurement to eliminate hepatitis C“. Available at 
https://www.bmj.com/content/365/bmj.l1994.short  
15  Zamora, B., Maignen, F., O’Neill, P. et al. (2019). “Comparing access to orphan medicinal products in Europe.” Orphanet J 
Rare Dis 14, 95. Available at https://doi.org/10.1186/s13023-019-1078-5  
16  Kanavos, P., Fontrier, A., Gill, J., & Efthymiadou, O. (2020). “Does external reference pricing deliver what it promises? 
Evidence on its impact at national level.” Eur J Health Econ (21): 129–151. Retrieved 29 January, 2020, from 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10198-019-01116-4 
17  Van Dyck, W., Riccaboni, M., & Swoboda, T. 2020. Pharmaceutical net price transparency across European markets: 
Insights from a Multi-Agent simulation model, Vlerick Policy Paper Series #13. Brussels, Belgium: Healthcare Management 
Centre, Vlerick Business School.  
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innovative medicines, such as generics and biosimilars (not the focus of this white paper), greater 
NPT is likely to have less of an effect and potentially could even result in lower prices across 
markets. This is especially true of markets that do not now effectively use the available competition 
for these product types. 
 
Figure 3: Price convergence means that markets with more stringent budget constraints will 
be kept out of the market and see increased delays to access 
 
Illustrative representation: an accurate economic representation would consider additional market characteristics and 
dynamics (e.g. price elasticities, costs structure, price formation mechanism). However, the outcome from Situation 2 (i.e. 
no access in country B) represents an actual outcome that is possible under given circumstances. 
Source: CRA Expert Advisory Board (2020). 
 
Lastly, NPT could lead to considerable uncertainty and affect innovation. Although Europe 
only accounts for 23.3% of global pharmaceutical sales (2019 figures),18 greater NPT could impact 
prices in countries that reference European list prices (e.g. Australia, Canada and Japan); lower 
                                                 
18  EFPIA (2019). “The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures: Key Data”. Available at https://www.efpia.eu/media/412931/the-
pharmaceutical-industry-in-figures-2019.pdf 
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prices in these markets could lead to reduced revenue and therefore to a reduction in capital 
available to re-invest in R&D. Similarly, with the Trump administration having made proposals for 
the use of IRP in the United States (US) for Medicare drugs,19 and the new administration 
continuing to show interest in IRP legislation,20 this effect could be multiplied given the significant 
proportion of the market for which the US is responsible (the European Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) reports that the US and Canada were 
responsible for nearly 50% of the pharmaceutical market in 2019).21,22  
 
Conclusions 
The potential consequences of greater NPT in Europe show how important it is that policy 
regarding NPT is based on the economics of pharmaceutical pricing and is evidence-based. 
In summary, there is a consensus across technical experts that greater NPT in Europe – as a single 
measure – is a risky and inefficient policy proposal to address issues in the healthcare system 
(without a level of solidarity between countries that would support differential pricing in the presence 
of NPT, that does not exist today). Although some advocates theorise that prices will decrease with 
greater NPT, an analysis based on economic theory shows that the picture is more complex, with 
significant associated risks for payer budgets and a danger of having the opposite impact in many 
markets, especially with regard to innovative medicines. Even if, in theory, greater NPT could lead 
to greater access to innovative medicines in high-income markets, this was not the opinion of the 
payers surveyed for this white paper. Only by bringing together a range of stakeholders to discuss 
the political and technical consequences of transparency will we be able to develop policy proposals 
that improve trust while maintaining efficiency in healthcare decision-making and patient access. 
 
                                                 
19  US Government website (2019). “Lower Prescription Drug Costs Now”. Available at: 
https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/HR3%20Backgrounder%2010.2.19.pdf  
20  Joe Biden Website (2020). “Healthcare”. Available at https://joebiden.com/healthcare/#  
21  EFPIA (2019). “The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures: Key Data”. Available at https://www.efpia.eu/media/412931/the-
pharmaceutical-industry-in-figures-2019.pdf 
22  Dubois, P., Gandhi, A., & Vasserman, S. 2019. Bargaining and international reference pricing in the pharmaceutical industry, 
NBER Working Paper: University of Toulouse Capitole and Harvard University, Department of Economics 
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1. Introduction 
As a response to the intense international debate on the transparency of biopharmaceuticals prices 
in Europe, Merck Sharp & Dohme (MSD) asked Charles River Associates (CRA) to curate a panel 
of experts to develop evidence on the impact of greater net price transparency (NPT) of innovative 
medicines. Professor Walter Van Dyck23 and Professor Massimo Riccaboni24 were asked by CRA 
to lead the research into the impact of greater NPT, supported by a wider panel of 10 experts from 
a range of European markets. This white paper documents the results of this analysis: first, defining 
the concept of NPT, then integrating the perspective of a diverse pool of expert stakeholders, and 
finally validating the findings through the development of a computational model of the 
consequences for European stakeholders of an increased level of transparency of NPT.  
1.1. Background of the debate 
The merits of having more or less transparency on prices has been a topic for discussion not just in 
the life science sector but across businesses and industry in general for many decades. On one 
hand, classical economic theory posits “perfect competition” (an idealistic scenario) where 
purchasers have full information on prices and product characteristics, and this results in a market 
outcome with uniform and competitive prices for comparable goods to the benefit of society.25 On 
the other hand, there are theoretical arguments against price transparency. Firstly, given the realities 
of how markets work, economic theory shows that in more concentrated markets or markets where 
goods are imperfect substitutes (as could be argued in the case of innovative pharmaceuticals), 
information exchanges and increased price transparency can have anticompetitive effects, leading 
to higher prices and a lower output, to the detriment of society.26 In particular, the reduction of the 
uncertainty in competitive price negotiations (i.e. reduction of the need to offer a better discount 
relative to the competitor) and the introduction of effective means to support tacit collusive 
agreements (i.e. competitors will know if net prices do not follow specific patterns) can further 
diminish competition.27,28 Secondly, establishing different prices across different markets can lead 
to a higher level of output (or access when considering pharmaceuticals) and incentivise innovation 
– price transparency can thus be determined detrimental to innovation if it leads to price 
convergence.29 It is also important to note that beyond a purely economic assessment, based on 
                                                 
23  Associate Professor of Technology & Innovation Management, Vlerick Business School, Belgium 
24  Professor of Economics, AXES Research Unit at IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca, Italy 
25  Kaya, A., & Liu, Q. (2015). “Transparency and price formation.” Theoretical Economics, 10(2): 341–383. 
26  Boone, J., & Pottersz, J. (2006). “Transparency and prices with imperfect substitutes.” Economics Letters, 93(3): 398–404. 
27  Kyle, M.K. & Ridley, D.B. (2007). “Would Greater Transparency and Uniformity of Health Care prices Benefit Poor Patients?”. 
Health Affairs, 26 (5): 1384–1391. DOI 10.1377/hlthaff.26.5.1384 
28  Danzon, P. M., & Towse, A. (2003). “Differential pricing for pharmaceuticals: reconciling access, R&D and patents.” 
International journal of health care finance and economics, 3(3): 183–205. 
29  Berdud, M., Chalkidou, K., Dean, E., Ferraro, J., Garrison, L., Nemzoff, C., Towse, A. (2019). The Future of Global Health 
Procurement: Issues around Pricing Transparency. Research Paper 19/04, Office of Health Economics 
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efficiency and utility, there are other arguments for transparency associated with good governance 
and enhanced democracy.  
The debate on transparency in the purchase of pharmaceuticals is also long-standing. For example, 
in the European Union (EU), the ‘Transparency Directive’ (Council Directive 89/105/EEC)30 defines 
a series of procedural requirements designed to verify that national pricing and reimbursement 
decisions do not create obstacles to the pharmaceutical trade within the EU’s Internal Market.  
However, the international debate on net price transparency of innovative medicines has intensified 
in recent years. While it is generally understood that confidential pricing agreements have been 
introduced to reduce the impact of medicines cost on the budget and to improve the use of new 
technologies, there have also been claims that the existence of confidentiality agreements has meant 
that the list prices are not the actual prices of medicines, impacting those countries that use list prices 
in other markets as part of their price determination process.31 In the past few years, in addition to 
advocacy groups, organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)32 have 
published reports calling for an international focus on transparency in the pharmaceutical sector and 
focused specifically on prices. This culminated with the World Health Assembly (WHA) approving a 
resolution to support greater public disclosure of prices and research and development (R&D) costs 
for medicines and other health products. This was approved in May 2019 with support from 
governments in 22 other countries, including several European markets.33 In addition, in September 
2020, the WHO published a new pricing policy guideline34 recommending that countries improve the 
transparency of pricing processes and prices. 
Focusing on European countries, it is not uncommon for European payers to request 
pharmaceuticals to disclose the confidential net prices negotiated with other countries to inform their 
own pricing process either through formal (for example in Austria where statutory discounts in 
referenced member states should be ‘taken into account’ 35) or informal (for example in the 
Netherlands when the minister of health wrote an open letter to pharmaceutical companies to request 
                                                 
30  EUR-Lex : Access to European Union Law [las accessed 14 December 2020]: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A31989L0105  
31  Iunes, R.F., Uribe, M.V., Torres, J.B. et al. (2019). “Confidentiality agreements: a challenge in market regulation”. Int J Equity 
Health 18, 11 https://doi.org/10.1186/s12939-019-0916-3 
32  OECD (2017). “New Health Technologies, Managing Access, Value and Sustainability”. Available at 
https://images.politico.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/OECD-on-new-drugs-and-pricing.pdf  
33  The Seventy-Second World Health Assembly, Agenda item 11.7 (2019). “Improving the transparency of markets for 
medicines, vaccines, and other health products”. Available at 
http://www.salute.gov.it/imgs/C_17_notizie_3769_listaFile_itemName_0_file.pdf  
34  WHO (2020). “WHO guideline on country pharmaceutical pricing policies”. Available at 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/335692/9789240011878-eng.pdf  
35  Bundesministerium für Gesundheit und Frauen (2017). Regelung für die Vorgehensweise der Preiskommission bei der 
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greater price transparency36) channels. More recently, following the resolution approved by the 
WHA, a Decree has been published in Italy stating that the manufacturer must provide information 
about “marketing, consumption and the reimbursement in other countries … including any further 
negotiation agreements” in order to begin the reimbursement negotiation process.37 However, it is 
important to note that confidential agreements made in other markets have been respected by the 
implementation guidelines published in September.38 Beyond payers and policymakers, new 
stakeholders are focusing on NPT: for example, in France, a new civil group called the ‘Drug 
Transparency Observatory’ has been launched to “closely monitor” government implementation of 
the WHA resolution.39 
There are clearly very different views on the merits of NPT. The purpose of this analysis is to 
understand these different perspectives and look for consensus. It is therefore useful to start with 
the published views of different stakeholders. 
 
1.2. Views of key stakeholders: policymakers, NGOs and the industry 
The views of the policymakers 
One way to look at the view of European policymakers is to consider support for the recent proposal 
that was submitted to the WHA in 2019, led by the Italian Ministry of Health.40 The proposal was 
supported by 22 countries (including 9 European countries); however, 3 European markets have 
actively dissociated themselves from the final document, arguing that there has been insufficient 
time to evaluate the complex implications of such a resolution (Table 2).41 The final vote resulted in 
the adoption of the proposal, with a large number of countries voting for its approval, showing that 
at a policymaker level there is considerable, although not universal, support for transparency. 
 
                                                 
36  Medicines Law and Policy (2019). “Dutch Minister of Health writes open letter to pharma, threatens to name and shame”. 
Available at https://medicineslawandpolicy.org/2019/08/dutch-minister-of-health-writes-open-letter-to-pharma-threatens-to-
name-and-shame/ 
37  AIFA (2020). “Decreto 10 Luglio 2020”. Available at https://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/gu/2020/07/24/185/sg/pdf  
38  AIFA (2020). “Linee guida per la compilazione del Dossier a supporto della domanda di rimborsabilità e prezzo di un 
medicinale”. Available at: 
https://www.aifa.gov.it/documents/20142/0/AIFA_Linee+Guida_v.+16.9.2020+per+consultazione+pubblica.pdf/64f8d5b5-
69df-a799-9ae7-36a5743d5f17  
39  Health Policy Watch, medicines & Vaccines (2019) “New Drug Transparency Observatory Launched In France”. Available at 
https://healthpolicy-watch.news/new-drug-transparency-observatory-launched-in-france/ 
40  The Seventy-Second World Health Assembly, Agenda item 11.7 (2019). “Improving the transparency of markets for 
medicines, vaccines, and other health products”. Available at 
http://www.salute.gov.it/imgs/C_17_notizie_3769_listaFile_itemName_0_file.pdf 
41  WHO (2019). “World Health Assembly Update, 28 May 2019”. Available at https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/28-05-2019-
world-health-update-28-may-2019  
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Table 2: European countries supporting and dissociated from the draft proposal of the 
resolution for greater public disclosure of prices and R&D costs (2019) 














Source: Pharma World Magazine (2019). “The WHA has approved the resolution of transparency of drug prices”. Available 
at https://www.pharmaworldmagazine.com/the-wha-has-approved-the-resolution-on-transparency-of-drug-prices/ ; WHO 
(2019). “Improving the transparency of markets for medicines, vaccines, and other health products”. Available at 
http://www.salute.gov.it/imgs/C_17_notizie_3769_listaFile_itemName_0_file.pdf  
Note: The final proposal was adopted with the majority of the votes of the WHA; however, the votes of individual countries 
are unknown.  
 
The views of NGOs 
The view of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has typically been to support greater NPT, 
especially with regard to improving access to medicines in lower-income countries. For instance, 
Médecins Sans Frontières published an article in 2019 titled ‘Secret Medicine Prices Cost Lives’. 
This article was published in advance of the 2019 WHO Fair Pricing Forum in which increased 
transparency in medicines pricing was a key topic for discussion. The article states: ‘Fair pricing 
depends on fair negotiations, and there cannot be fair negotiations without transparency’. The same 
article also states that confidentiality prevents there being a direct connection between R&D costs 
and medicine prices, indicating that a key rationale for supporting price transparency comes from 
the hope of moving towards a cost-plus pricing model.42  
In recent years, new NGOs within Europe have also supported increased price transparency. For 
instance, as mentioned, the ‘Drug Transparency Observatory’ has formed in France following the 
adoption of the WHA resolution. The Observatory calls on the French government and all countries 
to implement not only the adopted resolution on the transparency of medicines markets but also the 
transparency measures included in the initial resolution draft, which go beyond just medicines 
pricing.43 
                                                 
42  Médecins Sans Frontières (2019). “Secret medicine prices cost lives”. Available at https://msfaccess.org/secret-medicine-
prices-cost-lives  
43  Health Policy Watch (2019). “New Drug Transparency Observatory Launched in France. Available at 
https://donttradeourlivesaway.wordpress.com/2019/06/17/new-drug-transparency-observatory-launched-in-france/  
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On the other hand, some NGOs have recognised the value of confidential agreements to provide 
efficient access to medicines and ensure the sustainability of the national health system. For 
example, in Italy, Cittadinanzattiva (a consumer organisation) and the CnAMC44 responded to recent 
draft guidelines published by the Italian Medicines Agency (AIFA) stating that “violating the 
confidentiality clauses would mean questioning the agreements and inevitably lengthen access times 
(if not prevent) for some highly innovative therapies” and that “this could also affect the sustainability 
of the healthcare system [expenditure]”.45 Their position was also supported by 32 Italian patient 
organisations. 
 
The views of the biopharmaceutical industry 
Although the innovative biopharmaceutical industry is accused of being against transparency, it has 
supported several initiatives to increase transparency across various domains of the pharmaceutical 
sector. For example, the industry has worked with the European Commission and national 
governments on the improved transparency of clinical trial information and information regarding the 
relationship with healthcare professionals.46 However, with regard to NPT, the view of the 
biopharmaceutical industry remains that NPT would, given the use of international reference pricing, 
lead to price convergence and reduced access to patients.47 Indeed, in a response to an EC draft 
opinion on innovative payment models for high-cost innovative medicines, the European Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) makes its position on the value of confidential 
price agreements clear, stating: “Confidentiality of net prices creates incentives for innovation while 
facilitating access to medicines for countries with lower ability to pay.” 48,49 
 
                                                 
44  Coordinamento nazionale delle Associazioni dei Malati Cronici which translates to “National Coordination of Associations of 
Chronic Patients”. The CnAMC is a Cittadinanzattiva network which represents an alliance between associations and 
federations of people affected by chronic and rare diseases. 
45  Cittadinanzattiva (2020). “Consultazione pubblica sulle ‘Linee guida per la domanda di rimborsabilità e prezzo di un 
medicinale’, pubblicate dall’Agenzia Italiana del Farmaco il 16 settembre 2020”. Available at https://www.parkinson-
italia.it/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/CITTADINANZATTIVA-Consultazione-pubblica-linee-guida-domanda-rimborsabilita-
prezzo-di-un-medicinale.pdf  
46  Baronikova, S., Purvis, J., Southam, E., Beeso, J., Panayi, A., & Winchester, C. (2019). “Commitments by the 
biopharmaceutical industry to clinical trial transparency: the evolving environment.” BMJ evidence-based medicine, 24(5): 
177–184. 
47  MAP BioPharna (2019). “Pricing transparency proposals challenged by EFPIA”. Available at 
https://mapbiopharma.com/home/2019/08/pricing-transparency-proposals-challenged-by-efpia/  
48  EFPIA (2017). “EFPIA Response to Draft Opinion on Innovative payment models for high-cost innovative medicines”, 
https://www.efpia.eu/media/288630/final_efpia-response-to-exph-draft-opinion-7_12_2017_wir.pdf  
49  Roediger, A. (2019). “Blinded by the light: A first step towards trust could be a transparent conversation about the principles 
we as stakeholders have in common. The EFPIA Oncology Platform sees itself as an attempt to do so. One such principle is 
certain: that there is no valuable innovation without a patient who can access and benefit from it”. Available at 
https://www.efpia.eu/news-events/the-efpia-view/blog-articles/blinded-by-the-light-guest-blog/  
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1.3. A multifaceted methodology 
As a response to the intense international debate on the transparency of medicine prices in Europe, 
the objective of this white paper has been to explore the technical aspects of the debate around 
greater NPT to add to the existing evidence focused more on high-level principles. A multifaceted 
approach has been taken to realise this goal: 
• A structured literature review 
• A qualitative survey of a sample of European payers on the benefits and costs of NPT  
• The establishment and consultation of an expert advisory board representing a range of 
different European countries 
• Development of a computational model analysis of the impact of NPT on European countries 
The development of the computational model has been led by Professor Van Dyck and Professor 
Riccaboni. Ultimately the objective is to publish the results of the computational model in a peer-
reviewed journal separate to this white paper. This white paper provides an interim analysis 
summarising the consensus reached during an advisory board with the co-authors of this publication. 
The coordination of the work and development of the paper has been facilitated by CRA, and 
sponsored by MSD, but the intellectual contribution is attributable to the experts authoring this 
analysis. 
 
The structured literature review 
The literature review followed a tiered approach. We first reviewed papers setting out the economic 
theory both for and against greater NPT in the innovative pharmaceutical industry, including the 
theoretical consequences of greater NPT. Paper were selected according to their technical 
robustness and relevance to the topic (Table 3). 
Table 3: Approach to the structured literature review 
Topic Description 
Key words “pharmaceutical prices”; “transparency”; “confidentiality” “rebates disclosure” and 
permutations (e.g. price instead of prices) 
Search 
engines 
Google Scholar; Google; EconLit; PubMed 






Two reviewers researching the literature independently and consolidating their 
findings 
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Relevant papers have first been scrutinised based on the relevance of their titles 
and abstracts. Relevant articles have been read in full, and only articles with 
robust economic and technical approaches have been considered  
Handsearch Inclusion of additional relevant studies referenced in the papers initially selected 




In total, 22 studies were identified and reviewed. These studies have been used to distil a list of 
potential implications (both positive and negative) from greater NPT that were summarised as 
background to the advisory board meeting. The findings from the review summarised the full range 
of potential consequences, with both the potential advantages and disadvantages presented to 
experts during one-to-one interviews prior to the advisory board. 
A more detailed literature review was then undertaken to identify econometric or simulation analysis 
testing the impact of increased NPT for the prices of branded, on-patent medicines on the budget of 
national payers in Europe. As confirmed by the recent systematic literature review conducted by the 
WHO,50 there are no studies available to document this.  
Finally, we looked beyond the literature on innovative medicines, to identify different approaches to 
building a computational model: these articles look at the technical aspect of different modelling 
approaches. The main objective of the review was not to systematically review all the publications in 
the field but to collect the building blocks of the model presented in this analysis. 
 
A survey of the current view of European payers with respect to NPT 
While the perspectives of policymakers/politicians, academics and NGOs are well known and usually 
receive wide media coverage, the perspectives of national payers are often less known. To gather a 
snapshot of the views of different payers within Europe, we conducted an online survey of 16 
European payers representing 10 European countries (Table 4). Individuals interviewed represented 
a range of payer decision makers or payer advisors from key national pricing bodies. The countries 
were selected to ensure that a range of different European geographies and country characteristics 
were represented in the results (both larger and smaller countries, different levels of income and 
different regions: Nordics as well as Southern, Western and Eastern European). The objective was 
to survey two payers per country, although in some circumstances this was not possible.51 The 
survey was conducted online through SurveyMonkey in July 2020. 
 
                                                 
50  WHO (2020). “WHO guideline on country pharmaceutical pricing policies”. Available at 
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/335692/9789240011878-eng.pdf  
51  In one case, the payer surveyed is also a member of the advisory board. In the cases of Greece, Poland, Portugal and 
Sweden, only one payer/payer advisor was surveyed from each. 
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Table 4: Individuals surveyed in the national payer survey 
Country #  Organisation Role of individual 1 Role of individual 2 
France 2 CEPS Ex-payer Ex-payer 
Germany 2 G-BA  Ex-payer Payer advisor 
Greece 1 EOPYY Ex-payer – 
Italy 2 CPR (AIFA) Ex-payer Current payer 
Netherlands 2 ZIN Payer advisor Payer advisor 
Poland 1 MoH Ex-payer – 
Portugal 1 INFARMED Payer advisor – 
Spain 2 DGFPS  Ex-payer  Ex-payer advisor 
Sweden 1 TLV Ex-payer – 
England 2 NICE  Current payer Ex-payer advisor 
Source: CRA 
 
The survey included questions on the payer’s preference for greater NPT, the type of information 
they would like to be disclosed and they would be ready to disclose, their expectation in terms of 
impact of increased transparency on prices and access, and how these would vary across different 
therapy areas and scenarios for information disclosure.52 Responses were anonymised as per 
European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) requirements, and some key insights were 
used as input to the advisory board discussion.  
The establishment and consultation of an expert advisory board 
To try to develop a consensus on the economic impact of NPT in Europe, building on the results of 
the payer survey, an expert advisory board of economic and health economic experts from 12 
European markets was established. The selection of the experts was made following two criteria: 
First, 12 European countries were identified to be representative of the different national contexts 
that can be observed across Europe (considering market size and relative income of the markets). 
Second, for each of the markets, an economic or health economic expert was identified based on 
their expertise on NPT (based on publications and participation in national debates). The final list of 
experts involved in the advisory board is shown in alphabetical order of their respective countries 
(Table 5). 
Table 5: European experts participating in the advisory board 
Country Expert 
Belgium Walter Van Dyck *, Vlerick Business School 
Croatia Luka Voncina, University of Rijeka  
France Pierre Bentata, Asterès and Y Schools 
                                                 
52  Survey questions can be provided upon request. 
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Germany Wolfgang Greiner, Bielefeld University 
Greece Kostas Athanasakis, National School of Public Health  
Italy Massimo Riccaboni *, IMT School for Advanced Studies 
Netherlands Wim Groot, Maastricht University 
Poland Marcin Czech, Warsaw University of Technology 
Portugal João Marques-Gomes, Nova University Lisbon 
Spain Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz, Universidad Carlos III Madrid 
Switzerland 
Pius Gyger, Independent Consultant, previously member of Federal 
Commission of Drugs (EKDF) 
UK Jack Scannell, Innogen Institute, Innogen Associate, University of Edinburgh 
*Leading investigators 
 
Each expert was interviewed individually prior to the collective discussion to collect their views on 
the topic of NPT,53 their understanding of the consequences of increased NPT (especially in 
reference to their respective countries) and the economic arguments and evidence to support their 
views. The findings from the individual interviews were consolidated as background to the advisory 
board, identifying areas of consensus but also of divergent opinions, and presented to an advisory 
board meeting involving all the experts. The meeting took place virtually on 26 August 2020. All the 
experts on the board were invited to provide their opinions on the different topics under Chatham 
House rules.54 Comments from the participants were provided verbally but also discussed in the 
virtual chat of the meeting platform. In the meeting, we discussed whether there was consensus 
about the consequences of greater NPT on national budgets, on financial incentives for the industry 
and future R&D, and on patient outcomes and access to treatment. This was subsequently written 
up, and the same experts were given the opportunity to review the record of the advisory board. The 




                                                 
53  Due to availability, the initial one-to-one call with the French experts was attended by a team of economists from the same 
firm (Asterès): Professor Nicolas Bouzou, Charles-Antoine Schwerer and Alice Bouleau 
54  The principle that information disclosed during the meeting may be reported by those present, but the source of that 
information may not be explicitly or implicitly identified. 
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Results from a computational model55 
As noted in the literature review, most of the papers on NPT are theoretical in nature, and with little 
empirical evidence being presented to show the expected impact of greater NPT in Europe. Experts 
highlighted that this is because greater NPT remains a theoretical change and we do not have 
transparent prices implemented in the vast majority of the countries at present. To address this gap 
in the literature, a computational model has been developed by the two leading investigators 
(Professor Walter Van Dyck and Professor Massimo Riccaboni). This computational model explores 
the effects of Europe-wide NPT policy on the net pharmaceutical prices reached in different 
countries. The model works by simulating the country-level bargaining process that takes place 
between a country’s payer authority and the manufacturer and by considering what would happen if 
there was NPT. In this case, the price reached in each of the countries considered would be made 
visible for reference in all other countries. The full methodology and results of this computational 
model are presented in a separate technical research paper; in this white paper we include the main 
findings.  
 
1.4. Structure of the white paper 
This white paper presents the views expressed by economic and health economic experts during an 
advisory board meeting and discusses the degree to which there is a consensus across experts. 
Additional evidence from the payer survey and the structured literature review are integrated into the 
analysis throughout the white paper, and key insights from the computational model developed in 
tandem have been summarised in Section 3.1. In Chapter 2, we define the concept of NPT. In 
Chapter 3, we analyse the consequences of greater NPT on national budgets. Chapter 4 discusses 
the impact of increased NPT on the functioning of the pharmaceutical market. In Chapter 5 we look 
at the impact NPT has on patients, and whether this varies in terms of disease area. Chapter 6 
presents our conclusions on the implications of increased NPT. 
  
                                                 
55  Van Dyck, W., Riccaboni, M., & Swoboda, T. 2020. Pharmaceutical net price transparency across European markets: Insights 
from a Multi-Agent simulation model, Vlerick Policy Paper Series #13. Brussels, Belgium: Healthcare Management Centre, 
Vlerick Business School. 
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2. Putting the net price transparency debate into context 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Requests for ‘greater transparency’ are often made without recognising the 
difference between ‘price transparency’ and ‘pricing transparency’; there is therefore 
a need to understand this distinction and to provide clarity on the definition of ‘net 
price transparency’ as in the scope of this white paper. 
• The practical challenges of making net price information transparent in a meaningful 
way are often overlooked: 
o How to account for the multiple net prices that one medicine can have in a 
market 
o How to account for situations in which the price is calculated through a 
managed entry agreement (MEA) or retrospectively 
o How to account for current confidentiality clauses in national legislation 
 
2.1. A definition of ‘net price transparency’  
To advance the debate on transparency, it is important to make a distinction between requests for 
the disclosure of confidential information and requests for increased transparency in decision-making 
(Table 6). Often these two requests are not separated by advocates, with many requests made more 
generally for ‘greater transparency’ or with definitions conflating both pricing (i.e. pricing process) 
and price transparency. 
Table 6: Definition of ‘pricing transparency’ vs ‘price transparency’ 
Pricing transparency 
Or pricing process 
transparency 
Transparency of the process used to determine prices, aiming to 
ensure accountability of the reimbursement decision-making process 
Price transparency 
Transparency of the final price level agreed between payers and 
manufacturers, aiming to disclose any preferential rebates a payer 
may have achieved 
Source: CRA 
 
Our paper focuses on transparency of net prices (price transparency) and the ongoing debate 
regarding the potential economic consequences of such a measure. The beneficial role of 
transparency in the decision-making process (pricing transparency/pricing process transparency) is 
generally agreed across payers and industry (although many markets do not employ such 
transparent measures) and is associated in the literature with good governance, enhanced 
democracy and efficiency. Transparency of governance and decision-making, particularly regarding 
purchasing decisions, helps to build trust amongst the public (when it is taxpayer money being used) 
but also amongst competitors and those responsible for ensuring markets work effectively, i.e. 
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regulators. With regard to medicines, and their prices in particular, a range of stakeholders support 
transparency of the price negotiation process in order to better understand whether the price has 
been negotiated following a given set of rules established to protect the interests of all the 
stakeholders, and to ensure the accountability of the pricing and reimbursement decision-making 
process.56 Some experts have suggested that instead of looking for greater price transparency, 
markets which do not have effective pricing transparency measures should focus on this to ensure 
that they are not overpaying for medicines from a local value perspective.57 
This is different to the debate on NPT, which refers to the concept that the ex-factory price of a 
medicine, as agreed through confidential pricing mechanisms between national payers and 
manufacturers, is made transparent to third parties.  
We note that there are many different prices associated to medicines: there is the list price publicly 
disclosed by the manufacturer, the price including distribution margins and taxes, the prices agreed 
with the national payer after taking into account rebates, discount and clawbacks. The price can also 
vary depending on whether the product goes through a regional process or is subsequently 
negotiated at the hospital level. However, in line with the ongoing debate, we define NPT as referring 
to the price agreed with the national payer to be paid to the manufacturer of a product after taking 
into account rebates, discounts, clawbacks and managed entry agreements.58 
 
2.2. The practical challenges associated to ‘net price transparency’  
Although the marketing authorisation process for medical products is harmonised for EU Member 
States (through the European Medicines Agency), pricing and reimbursement remains a national 
competence, meaning that a national price for a medicine is normally agreed between the 
manufacturer and the relevant national authority (the payer).59 There is often a published price – this 
is commonly defined as the “list” price. However, this is rarely the price actually paid for a medicine 
or the amount of money that the manufacturer receives. This is due to confidential negotiations 
between said national payer and the manufacturer. Further to this, the final price of an innovative 
medicine can be further impacted by additional sub-national pricing agreements with regional 
authorities, further discounts agreed with hospitals or groups and margins implemented by 
wholesalers (Table 7). It is also possible for broader caps by therapy area or on branded 
pharmaceuticals in general to be applied at the national level to cap expenditure. The result is that 
                                                 
56  Roediger, A. (2019). “Blinded by the light: A first step towards trust could be a transparent conversation about the principles 
we as stakeholders have in common. The EFPIA Oncology Platform sees itself as an attempt to do so. One such principle is 
certain: that there is no valuable innovation without a patient who can access and benefit from it”. Available at 
https://www.efpia.eu/news-events/the-efpia-view/blog-articles/blinded-by-the-light-guest-blog/  
57  CRA Expert Advisory Board 
58  This does not consider additional discounts made at the sub-national level because the main request from advocates of 
greater NPT appears to be around the national net prices (moreover, on a technical ground, while there are already 
considerable differences between the structures of European national healthcare systems, which make cross-country 
comparisons relatively uninformative, differences at sub-national level are even more pronounced). 
59  WHO (2020). “Medicines Reimbursement Policies in Europe”. Available at 
https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/376625/pharmaceutical-reimbursement-eng.pdf  
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there are many different net prices associated with a single innovative medicine, indicating a key 
practical challenge with implementing greater NPT.  
Even at the national level it can be hard to define the ‘net price’ of a medicine, due to the 
implementation of payment mechanisms such as MEAs. MEAs are arrangements between 
manufacturers and payers that are used to manage uncertainty and include terms conditional on 
how the medicine is used in practice. They generally take two forms: (1) performance-based 
agreements that link the price or rebate level to the performance of a medicine (this can be 
established upon the collection of real-world data over a number of years) or (2) financial-based 
agreements that link the price or rebate level to metrics such as the volume of product used or cost-
savings made as a result of product use.60 As a result of MEAs, the national “net price” of a medicine 
is often not known to either the ‘buyer’ or the ‘seller’ until after a given period, when either outcomes 
are known or usage metrics have been collected.  
 
Table 7: Mechanisms used by national, regional and local health authorities to determine the 






A contractual agreement that enables reimbursement of a medicine subject to 
specified conditions. Conditions can be finance-based (e.g. cost caps, volume 
discounts) or performance-based (e.g. dependent on further evidence 
development, dependent on outcomes).61 
Sub-national 
negotiation 
In many markets, regional bodies determine reimbursement and can negotiate 
further discounts on a nationally agreed Net Price, either through the 
implementation of MEAs (see above) or through simple discounts and negotiations 
(e.g. with 17 regions in Spain62). 
Further to this, if a product does not receive national reimbursement, there are 
mechanisms for a manufacturer to gain access through individual negotiations 
with regional authorities (e.g. with clinical commissioning groups (CCGs) in the 
UK63) 
                                                 
60  OECD (2019). “Health Working Paper No. 115: Performance-based managed entry agreement for new medicines in OECD 
countries and EU member states”. Available at https://www.oecd.org/health/health-systems/HWP-115-MEAs.pdf  
61 WHO (2020). “Medicines Reimbursement Policies in Europe”. Available at 
https://www.euro.who.int/en/publications/abstracts/medicines-reimbursement-policies-in-europe 
62  ISPOR (2020). “Global Health Systems Road Maps – Pharmaceutical HTA and Reimbursement Processes – Spain”. 
Available at https://tools.ispor.org/htaro admaps/Spain.asp 
63  Monitor (2013). “Local price setting and contracting practices for NHS services without a nationally mandated price: A 
research paper”. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-price-setting-and-contracting-for-nhs-
services-without-a-national-price  
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Across Europe, hospitals tend to have autonomy on formulary and procurement 
decisions as well as additional restrictions on use (in some markets certain 
inpatient medicines are centrally procured). Part of gaining hospital formulary 
access can include additional discounts on prices.  
In many European markets (e.g. Romania, Czechia, Denmark) tendering is 
common for most inpatient medicines and is the responsibility of the hospitals.64 
Wholesaler 
margins 
Most countries have a mixture of national and regional wholesalers supplying 
medicines to pharmacies. These can be private or public (public being Central 
Medical Stores). Wholesalers purchase medicines at the “Net Price”, or 
Manufacturer Selling Price (MSP), but are able to make a margin on this when 
selling to retailers/health facilities.65  
 
The second complexity regarding NPT is transparency to whom. Requests for greater NPT should 
clarify exactly what is being requested to be made transparent (e.g. final price level, specific terms 
of agreements, discounts at the regional level, etc.) and also to whom the information should be 
disclosed (e.g. national pricing authorities, the public, other manufacturers, governments, other non-
European markets, etc.). In some cases, transparency can be requested from a country’s own pricing 
authority (i.e. intra-country transparency). For example, in some countries (e.g. Belgium), 
governments do not have transparency on the price agreed by their own payers and are therefore 
looking for more transparency within their own country. Alternatively, it could be transparency 
intended for patients/the general public in a country. However, the debate tends to focus on greater 
NPT across countries, with requests from one country to know the price being paid in another country 
(i.e. inter-country transparency). This is the case with the recent WHA resolution, led by the Italian 
government and supported by many other national governments, which is asking for national net 
prices across Europe to be made public by the manufacturers for the purposes of negotiation. 
Experts highlighted that it is critical that advocates for greater NPT are clearer about the form of NPT 
they are requesting in order for the subsequent debate to be sufficiently informed and dealing with 
less uncertainty. 
Finally, when considering how legislation for greater NPT would be implemented, it is necessary to 
consider the legal measures in place that currently maintain NPT for innovative medicines and 
therefore how new legislation (made at a national or international level) would dovetail with this. 
Currently, negotiations between payers and manufacturers result in agreements that often include 
requirements on confidentiality (often requested by both parties) that are mandated at a national 
level (for example Patient Access Schemes used in the UK 66). If greater NPT were to be 
                                                 
64  Vogler, S., Zimmermann, N., Leopold, C., Habl, C., & Mazag, J. (2013). “Discounts and Rebates Granted for Medicines for 
Hospital Use in Five European Countries”. The Open Pharmacoeconomics & Health Economics Journal, 5(1). DOI: 
10.2174/1876824520130426001 
65  WHO (2008). “Measuring medicine prices, availability, affordability and price components”. Available at: 
https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/access/OMS_Medicine_prices.pdf 
66  Jarosławski S, Toumi M. Design of patient access schemes in the UK: influence of health technology assessment by the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. Appl Health Econ Health Policy. 2011 Jul 1;9(4):209-15. doi: 
10.2165/11592960-000000000-00000. PMID: 21682349. 
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implemented either at the national or international level without explicitly stating how current 
confidentiality clauses should be taken into consideration, new legislation would likely be in breach 
of current pricing contracts, putting industry in an extremely complicated position. Country affiliates 
within an international company would not be able to share pricing information from other markets 
with their own payer authority despite requests. 
In conclusion, any proposal to increase NPT should be carefully articulated and consider all the 
technical aspects; otherwise it would be difficult to initiate a productive debate on the merits and 
consequences of such a proposal (Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Any proposal on transparency needs to specify type of information and to whom it 






There are several components to a Net Price agreement further to the price 
alone (e.g. specific repayment terms, renegotiation periods). In addition, there 
is contextual information (e.g. the rationale used to obtain a net price discount). 




Is this intra-country transparency or inter-country transparency, and which 





Confidential agreements are common across European countries.67 Proposals 
regarding greater NPT need to explain implications for the legal frameworks 
that are already in place.  
  
                                                 
67  WHO (2020). “Medicines Reimbursement Policies in Europe”. Available at 
https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/376625/pharmaceutical-reimbursement-eng.pdf 
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3. The political view is not always fully aligned with payers 
regarding the consequences of NPT on national budgets 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Generally, all policymakers and payers support greater “transparency” in policy 
debates due to the associated positive connotations with this term. 
• However, payers recognise that implementing greater NPT specifically, will have 
unintended consequences on national budgets and do not support its application 
in their own countries. 
• There is a consensus that greater NPT is expected to result in price convergence 
across European markets but that this is unlikely to affect European expenditure 
on innovative medicines. 
• There will be winners and losers from price convergence. 
3.1. Differences in the political and payer views 
The view of policymakers on greater NPT are public and widely reported by the media. Their support 
for the WHA resolution is one such example. The academic evidence on the views of policymakers 
shows there are clearly significant concerns about the price of innovative medicines and affordability 
in the healthcare system. Innovative medicine prices are widely perceived to be unaffordable, and 
policymakers question how they are justified.68 This indicates that perhaps pricing transparency 
(instead of NPT) would be a more appropriate solution. Moreover, the level of trust in the 
pharmaceutical industry is low69 and there is a lack of understanding amongst many people 
(including politicians) regarding the development process for pharmaceuticals, which could be 
responsible for concerns about excessive profitability.70 Based on their general support for the WHA 
resolution, we could assume that policymakers expect NPT would lead to lower prices and improved 
access. The views of those responsible for negotiating prices on behalf of public health systems 
(payers) are less clear. Beyond the personal thought pieces through which a number of individual 
experts have expressed their views, there is relatively little evidence. 
To understand the views of payers, we conducted a payer survey in which we asked a group of 
current and former payers and payer advisors about both their support for greater NPT and their 
expectations about the impact of greater NPT (as per the definition outlined in Table 6). This was 
presented to and discussed with the experts who participated in the advisory board.  
                                                 
68  Zaprutko, T., et al. (2017). “Affordability of medicines in the European Union”. Available at 
https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0172753  
69  Edelman (2019). “2019 Edelman Trust Barometer, Trust in Healthcare”. Available at 
https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2019-04/2019_Edelman_Trust_Barometer_Global_Health_Report.pdf  
70  Heinemann, L. (2009). “Trust: Need for an Improved Communication between the Public World and the Pharmaceutical 
Companies”. 
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We first asked payers whether they support greater NPT and what net price information they would 
most like to have. In general, European payers declared they are in principle supportive of greater 
NPT (Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Payers’ general support for greater NPT (n = 16) 
 
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020)71 
 
We then asked payers what determined their views. Some payers justified their support for greater 
NPT on the basis that ‘transparency = good’ (Table 9). Given the structure of pricing policy in some 
European markets, the similarity between payers and policymakers may not be surprising. For 
example, in Poland the Minister of Health has final approval on all drug reimbursement, in Greece 
the payer authority has very little autonomy from the elected Ministry of Health and in Spain sub-
national payer authorities are the elected local government officials.  




“When speaking about public money, a lack of transparency means a lack of 
democracy.” 
Portugal “I think that more transparency is better than less.” 
Spain 
“Taking into account that we are speaking about public money, there is no other 
option.” 
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020). 
 
                                                 
71  CRA Payer Survey. Q1: “Do you support calls for greater Net Price Transparency (i.e. the disclosure of confidential prices 











Q1: Support for greater NPT
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There is also a question of equity. Currently, the level of NPT across European markets varies 
significantly, with only a few countries having some level of transparency (Table 10). Some 
respondents highlighted that this variation is not fair and that this should be addressed. One German 
payer commented that they “prefer harmonisation when it comes to this topic [net price 
transparency], but if other countries do not switch to net price transparency, Germany should depart 
from its present transparency,” and similarly a payer from Sweden stated, “Of course, the 
precondition is that many countries are involved in the process.” 
Table 10: Current level of transparency for nationally agreed Net Prices in European markets 
represented in the advisory board 
Country Current level of national net price transparency 
Belgium Confidential 
Prices agreed at the national level are completely confidential 
and agreed through the process of negotiation. 
Croatia Confidential 
Innovative medicines are priced confidentially and subject to 
budget caps (per therapy area (TA) or per product), and 
managed entry agreements are used. 
France Confidential 
Prices agreed at the national level are completely confidential 




Nationally agreed net prices are transparent through the Lauer-
Taxe to those with accounts, which requires a paid subscription. 
Further discounts/MEAs through sickness funds are possible 
and are not transparent. 
Greece Confidential 
A series of confidential rebates are applied to official list prices. 
Recently, some products have been subject to formal, 
confidential negotiations. 
Italy Confidential 
Discounts to nationally agreed prices are confidential. Frequent 




National prices are transparent, and, in most cases, no further 
discounts are made. Some ‘high priced products’ are subject to 
a further confidential discount at the national level. 
Poland Confidential 
Implementation of MEAs and simple negotiated discounts mean 
net prices are kept confidential. 
Portugal Confidential 
Prices agreed at the national level are completely confidential 
and are the result of a negotiation process. 
Spain Confidential 
Prices agreed at the national level are completely confidential 
and agreed through the process of negotiation. 
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Ex-factory prices are listed transparently but represent the 
maximum price to be paid. A confidential rebate is often applied 
to this. Similarly, wholesale prices and prices paid by 
insurers/pharmacies are confidential. 
UK Confidential 
Prices can be freely set at launch after marketing authorisation, 
although in many cases there is a PAS;72 this involves a 
confidential discount, which is taken into account by the 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) when 
providing advice to NHS England. 
Source: CRA Expert Advisory Board 
 
Payers’ preference for net price information in other markets 
While one might expect payers to be most interested in net prices in lower-income markets (where 
medicine prices tend to be lower), the opposite was seen in the payer survey, with the highest levels 
of interest being shown in the net prices in relatively higher-income markets (e.g. Germany and the 
UK) and not those in lower-income markets (e.g. Greece and Poland) (Figure 5). Experts at the 
advisory board theorised that the high interest in UK prices was likely due to the fact that the UK 
health technology assessment (HTA) system is regarded as taking a strict approach to price 
determination (through their cost-effectiveness threshold), and payers would like to benefit from 
information about the resultant prices. It could be argued that this justifies improving the HTA 
systems in specific markets or sharing information on the value assessment process rather than 
asking for greater NPT. 
Figure 5: Surveyed payers’ level of interest in each European market’s net price (1 = no 
interest; 5 = extremely high interest)  
 
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020)73 
 
One other interesting finding from Figure 5 is the high level of interest that payers expressed in the 
German net price, where pricing at the national level is already transparent.74 The interest in German 
                                                 
72  PAS = Patient Access Scheme; often considered a form of financial Managed Entry Agreement (MEA) 
73  CRA Payer Survey: “Please indicate your level of interest for each of the following European markets, in having increased 
net price transparency”. 
74  Gandjour, A., Schüßler, S., Hammerschmidt, T., & Dintsios, C. M. (2020). “Predictors of negotiated prices for new drugs in 
Germany”. The European Journal of Health Economics, 1–9. 
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prices shows the complexity in the current debate and perhaps the limited understanding of NPT 
today. Regarding the interest in both Germany and the UK, some experts also highlighted that the 
high level of interest in net prices in higher-income markets could be explained by curiosity about 
the ‘volume effect’ and whether larger, richer markets (with increased bargaining power) manage to 
achieve greater discounts based on the volume of a medicine they would be paying for. 
In the UK, payers and politicians appear to be very much aligned in their attitude towards greater 
NPT. During the survey, UK payers consistently did not support greater NPT, based primarily on 
satisfaction with their own price-setting processes. Both UK payers highlighted that “the UK works 
independently and has a strong HTA body (NICE) that evaluates the clinical and cost-effectiveness 
of interventions independently” and “NICE is one of the toughest funding bodies, so I would be 
surprised if we didn't get one of the best discounts anyway.” This appears to be reflected by the UK 
government, as shown by its dissociation from the resolution approved by the WHA.  
Additionally, when asked whether, in exchange for sharing their net price information, payers would 
prefer to observe the net price information of all European markets or within a group of markets 
similar to their own, their preference was for the latter option (Figure 6). Payers noted that sharing 
net price information between a group of countries could be more valuable than between all 
European markets both because “it would also be important to share information with markets that 
have similar healthcare systems (e.g. no co-payment/universal coverage)” and because “it would be 
more efficient to start with transparency among a smaller group of markets and then later extend the 
procedure if it was having the desired effect.” This reflects the perception of some challenges in 
sharing information between dissimilar markets and the concern that NPT might not be as beneficial 
as some stakeholders theorise. If payers were fully in support of greater NPT and considered that 
there would be no downsides, it is reasonable to assume they would want to see prices in all markets. 
Figure 6: Payer level of interest in the net price information from all European countries or a 
group of countries 
   
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020)75 
 
3.2. Most payers expect there would be negative consequences from greater 
NPT 
The payer survey also asked respondents to indicate their expectations about greater NPT with 
regard to net prices and access in their market. Figure 7 shows an even split between payers who 
                                                 















s Full Transparency (i.e. all countries can see net 
prices) 
Other 
Cross-Country Collaboration (i.e. some 
countries can see net prices)  
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expected greater NPT to result in higher prices and those who expected lower prices. However, a 
clear majority of payers expected greater NPT to lead to slower access (a minority expected faster 
access). This is in contrast to the results presented in Figure 4 that show the majority of respondents 
indicating their support for greater NPT. This contrast between the general support for transparency 
and the expected impact of greater NPT on net prices and access shows that it is “politically” difficult 
for anyone to disagree with increased transparency (a principle that generally has positive 
connotations) even when they predict negative consequences, and it is a confidential survey.  
Figure 7: Payer expectations about the impact of greater NPT on net price levels and patient 
access (n = 16) 
 
*Other: Respondents indicated that they could not predict the outcome or that there would be a mix of outcomes (e.g. both 
higher and lower prices) dependent on current price levels and product characteristics. 
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020)76 
 
It is clear that greater NPT will limit (or potentially negate) the use of confidential agreements, which 
could subsequently result in prices going up. Given the nature of international reference pricing (IRP) 
mechanisms used widely, not just in Europe but also throughout the world, public list prices are a 
mechanism that prevents a downward pricing spiral for medicines from being triggered. Without 
confidential discounts, payers believe they would not be able to achieve the same net prices that 
they currently do under the public list price. The belief that confidentiality allows markets to achieve 
better prices is supported by the literature: a recent peer-reviewed study summarises an anonymous 
survey of payer authorities from public or social health insurance systems in 11 developed countries 
(Australia, Austria, Canada, England, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Scotland, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and the United States (US Department of Veterans Affairs)). When questioned on 
                                                 
76  CRA Payer Survey. Q2: “What do you expect to happen (i.e. not what you would like to happen) to the prices of innovative 
medicines in your market, if the level of price transparency is increased in all European markets, including yours (so the 
confidential prices negotiated in your market are known to others) and, at the same time, assuming that pharmaceutical 
companies would strategically react to the disclosure of confidential agreements?” Q3: What do you expect to happen (i.e. 
not what you would like to happen) to the time to access innovative medicines in your market, if the level of price transparency 
is increased in all European markets, including yours (so the confidential prices negotiated in your market are known to others) 
























Q2: Expected impact on Net Price Levels Q3: Expected impact on Access
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overall perceptions of the impact of negotiating confidential discounts on patented pharmaceuticals, 
the responses indicated that confidentiality is valued by almost all respondents (Table 11).77  
Table 11: Overall perceptions of the impact of negotiating confidential discounts on patented 
pharmaceuticals in 10 public and statutory health systems surveyed (n = 10)  
What is the overall impact of confidential price discounts for patented 
pharmaceuticals from a local health system perspective? 
# of respondents  
Very beneficial 5 
Somewhat beneficial 2 
Neither beneficial nor detrimental 1 
Somewhat detrimental 0 
Very detrimental 0 
No answer 2 
Source: Morgan, S., Vogler, S., & Wagner, A. (2017). Payers’ experiences with confidential pharmaceutical price discounts: 
A survey of public and statutory health systems in North America, Europe, and Australasia. Health Policy, 121(4), 354-362. 
 
Interestingly, in the payer survey, many respondents who indicated their general support for greater 
NPT also indicated that they value their own confidentiality:  
• As highlighted by one Dutch respondent, “there is a prisoners dilemma” where all markets 
would prefer the disclosure of net prices in other markets but would prefer to keep their own 
prices confidential.  
• A small number of respondents justified their support for greater NPT based on the fact that 
more information will put them in more informed positions for negotiations. They indicated 
that having access to the net prices agreed in other countries would help to strengthen their 
negotiation position (Table 12).78 However, even these respondents expressed reluctance 
to share the details of their own confidential agreements, because they believe that 
confidentiality allows them to achieve the best prices.  
This apparent contradiction of payers both valuing confidentiality to achieve better prices and also 
expressing support for greater NPT shows why the debate on transparency is complicated and 
confusing. For any one country, NPT of the price in other countries would apparently be beneficial, 
but NPT of their own prices to other markets would not.  
                                                 
77  Morgan, S., Vogler, S., & Wagner, A. (2017). “Payers’ experiences with confidential pharmaceutical price discounts: A 
survey of public and statutory health systems in North America, Europe, and Australasia.” Health Policy, 121(4): 354–362. 
doi: 10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.02.002 
78  Some argued the disclosure of manufacturer access strategies and increased information sharing about the effects of other 
pricing methods would also help them in their negotiations. 
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Table 12: Qualitative justification for supporting NPT based on increased information 
available for negotiation 
Market Quote 
Germany 
“We would like to assess whether we took the right figures into account and to 
initiate potential renegotiations” 
Italy “It would disclose manufacturers’ market access strategies” 
Netherlands “I assume we will be able to estimate the effects of the other [pricing] methods” 
Poland 
“[It is] possible to have some higher and lower prices where Poland is currently 
overpaying or underpaying. Same with access – it depends on the situation, 
which is currently unknown since prices are confidential.” 
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020) 
 
The reason payers believed that greater NPT would have negative consequences is that they have 
anticipated the impact on company strategy that would inevitably follow. This, they argue, would 
have the opposite effect to that intended (price increases and decreased access instead of price 
decreases and increased access, Table 13).  




“Italy is a reference country for others, so companies wish the shown price to be the 
highest. It will have a diffused inflationary effect” 
Portugal 
“We are assuming that price transparency would allow for a lower price. However, 
manufacturers knowing that the price would be shared would try to start with higher 
prices” 
Sweden 
“The initial strategic reaction of pharmaceutical companies might lead to price 
increases.” 
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020) 
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3.3. NPT will result in price convergence with negative consequences for 
national budgets, especially in lower-income countries 
There was consensus among experts on the advisory board that greater NPT can be expected to 
result in the convergence of prices across European countries because of the effects of IRP. The 
expectation of price convergence is consistent with the economic literature. Sellers would be less 
willing to negotiate lower prices to avoid a downward pricing spiral79 and prices could potentially 
align to price levels in markets with the highest willingness to pay (WTP) for medicines.80 Experts 
highlighted that price convergence does not necessarily mean that all European prices would be 
exactly the same, but it would result in much less differentiation in the ‘price corridor’.  
 
Potential scenarios for price convergence 
Experts highlighted that without being able to see the current net price differentiation across markets 
(due to the largely confidential nature of current agreements that are made) it can be hard to predict 
the exact impact of price convergence on final price levels across markets. It was therefore noted 
that the nature of net price convergence would depend on what markets are actually paying for 
innovative medicines, considering which markets are paying the most and the least. This was also 
stated by several payers during the survey (Table 14), reflecting the fact that some payers may gain 
from increased NPT while other may lose (in terms of impact on national budget).  
Table 14: Payers highlighted that the impact of greater NPT will depend on current net prices, 
which are confidential 
Market Quote 
Poland 
“It is possible to have some higher and lower prices where Poland is currently 
overpaying or underpaying... it depends on the situation, which is currently unknown 
since prices are confidential.” 
Italy 
“I would expect no change in prices or access for 60% of products, but the other 40% 
could see lower prices and faster access where we are overpaying” 
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020) 
 
Discussion amongst experts and responses from the payer survey indicated that the reaction of both 
payers and the industry to the disclosure on net prices plays a vital role in understanding how the 
dynamics of greater NPT will evolve. Although it is possible to predict that there will be price 
convergence, the “winners and losers” from this and the impact on overall budgets depends on 
                                                 
79  Kyle, M.K. & Ridley, D.B. (2007). “Would Greater Transparency and Uniformity of Health Care prices Benefit Poor Patients?” 
Health Affairs, 26 (5): 1384–1391. DOI 10.1377/hlthaff.26.5.1384 
80  Moira Dower, PVW Amsterdam, (2019). “Pressure for Price Transparency”, available at: 
https://www.pvwamsterdam.com/single-post/2019/09/04/Pressure-for-Price-Transparency  
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different factors and requires many different assumptions. As a result, experts suggested that the 
potential consequences of price convergence can be considered through a simulation model 
informed by similar models that analysed the impact of greater transparency on the sector of medical 
devices81 and in the wages market.82  
A key consideration, not in the remit of in this white paper, is the scenario that the US implements 
IRP. While the impact on price convergence is uncertain when considering Europe as a closed 
market (as done in this white paper), when the proposed changes to the US pricing system were 
factored in, there was consensus amongst experts at the advisory board that price convergence in 
countries being referenced by the US would be in the direction of US prices. This would result in a 
scenario in Europe where there are significantly more losers than winners from a national budget 
perspective, a scenario that should be given stronger consideration by advocates for greater NPT 
as this debate progresses. 
 
Expected impact of price convergence 
Assessments of the overall effect of greater NPT on national budgets should account not only for 
the strategic reaction of payers to increased information but also for the strategic reaction of 
manufacturers: in particular how the industry would be likely to adapt their commercial and pricing 
strategies to the new transparent environment where confidential discounts are not possible. In a 
situation of greater NPT, the economic literature highlights that pharmaceutical companies would 
have an incentive to avoid offering price concessions for a single market that would have a spillover 
impact in other potential more valuable markets from a commercial perspective.83 For example, this 
was seen within the pharmaceutical industry upon the US government’s adoption of the Most 
Favoured Customer clause mandating that prices offered to Medicaid must be at least equal to the 
lowest price being paid for the medicine elsewhere. This ultimately saw higher prices in non-Medicaid 
consumers in order to protect Medicaid prices.84 While this is an example within just one market, 
Figure 8 illustrates how price convergence could result in price increases across markets, by 
considering two scenarios. In scenario A, the price is lowered to the lowest price. This would clearly 
benefit the higher-price market and have no negative consequences for the lower-price market. 
However, in reality, we might also expect the company pricing strategy to adapt so that the price in 
lower-income countries takes into account the consequence in the higher-income market. Scenario 
B shows the higher-price country gains at the expense of the lower-price country.  
                                                 
81  Grennan, M. (2013). “Price discrimination and bargaining: Empirical evidence from medical devices”. American Economic 
Review, 103(1): 145–77. 
82  Cullen, Z. B., & Pakzad-Hurson, B. (2019, May). “Equilibrium effects of pay transparency in a simple labor market”. In EC (p. 
193). 
83  Shaw, B., & Mestre-Ferrandiz, J. (2020). “Talkin’ About a Resolution: Issues in the Push for Greater Transparency of Medicine 
Prices”. Pharmacoeconomics, 38(2): 125–134. doi: 10.1007/s40273-019-00877-3 
84  Scott Morton, F. (1996). “The Strategic Response by Pharmaceutical Firms to the Medicaid Most-Favored-Customer Rules”. 
Available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w5717  
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To examine how this might occur in Europe, a computational model was developed. The model 
simulates the effect of a counterfactual NPT policy on the net pharmaceutical prices negotiated in 
several European markets. In particular, it considers the case of an innovative pharmaceutical 
product facing no therapeutic competition. In a two-stage simulation design, first, countries negotiate 
with the manufacturer a national price both exhibiting a bargaining power resulting in a confidential 
rebate and a Nash equilibrium price obtained in each country for the quoted value-based price (VBP). 
Given the currently confidential nature of innovative medicine pricing, the computational model 
considers that the VBP (i.e. price obtained without transparency/under normal conditions) is the 
average of the published list prices for a selection of innovative medicines over the period 1996–
2008 with a normalised, average confidential rebate of 30% uniformly set for all countries.85 In the 
second stage, the model also assumes that there is full NPT, the bargaining power is unchanged 
and all markets will want to reference the lowest transparent price. In this situation, the manufacturer 
faces a reduced price in some markets, but this leads to a change in willingness to accept lower 
                                                 
85  Additional assumptions are made about the normalisation of each country market size (which was done taking OECD-reported 
country-level pharmaceutical spending and expressing each country’s PPP market size as a percentage of the largest 
pharmaceutical spending country) and the nature of the manufacturer’s marginal costs and profit margins. 
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prices in other markets. This effect can be expected since reduced profits in higher-income markets 
would need to be absorbed and therefore redistributed to lower-income markets. 
The results of the computational model are shown in Figure 9. Markets such as Greece, Spain, Italy, 
Poland and Portugal could expect price increases under transparent conditions whereas, according 
to the model, higher-income markets such as Germany, the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and 
Denmark could expect price decreases (price change below original). Interestingly, in these markets 
where prices are expected to decrease, the overall spend on pharmaceuticals as a proportion of 
healthcare spend is generally lower than in the markets that could expect price increases.86,87 At 
the extreme levels, some markets could see their prices increase (Greece) or decrease (Denmark) 
by as much as 60% should prices in Europe be made transparent. The results from this model do 
not take into account how purchasers would react. Indeed, it would seem economically irrational for 
countries suffering from such an increase in price levels to participate in a system with greater NPT. 
Therefore, we would not expect this simulated outcome to be sustainable.  




Source: Van Dyck, W., Riccaboni, M., & Swoboda, T. 2020. Pharmaceutical net price transparency across European markets: 
Insights from a Multi-Agent simulation model, Vlerick Policy Paper Series #13. Brussels, Belgium: Healthcare Management 
Centre, Vlerick Business School. 
The computational model also analyses the scenario (discussed in some political debates) whereby 
NPT is not applied to all European markets but is instead adopted within a group (collaboration) of 
                                                 
86  Pharmaceutical spend in Denmark as a proportion of overall spend (6.4%) is one of the lowest in the world, whereas Greece 
lies on the opposite end of the spectrum (26.2%). 
87  OECD (2019). “Pharmaceutical Spending as % of Health Spending”. Available at 
https://data.oecd.org/healthres/pharmaceutical-spending.htm  
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markets. This is the case, for instance, of the Valletta Declaration Group, which has been considering 
how to increase the transparency of medicines pricing.88 Although this avoids the transfer from the 
highest income to lowest, the same broad result occurs. In this case, the computational model shows 
that the benefit of having such a collaboration is inequitably distributed across the participating 
countries. The countries that had a higher than European average list price before the 
implementation of NPT within the group may benefit from it, while those that had a below European 
average list price would end up paying higher prices (Figure 10). 
Figure 10: Normalised price change under net price transparency within a group of countries 
such as the Valletta Declaration 
 
Source: Van Dyck, W., Riccaboni, M., & Swoboda, T. 2020. Pharmaceutical net price transparency across European markets: 
Insights from a Multi-Agent simulation model, Vlerick Policy Paper Series #13. Brussels, Belgium: Healthcare Management 
Centre, Vlerick Business School. 
 
The simulation is inevitably a simplification of reality. There are many other possible scenarios, which 
depend on various market characteristics and dynamics (e.g. price elasticities, costs structure, price 
formation mechanisms). Further, this computational model also only considers NPT in a closed 
European system and does not consider the more extreme scenario in which markets such as the 
US are able to reference transparent European net prices. It is not possible to determine with any 
accuracy who benefits and who loses, but it is clear that lower-income countries that are able to 
negotiate lower prices will lose from NPT, and higher-income countries that are paying higher prices 
will benefit; and in a more extreme scenario, with European NPT affecting other market dynamics, it 
is likely that the majority of European countries will be losers. 
                                                 
88  Eatwell, E., & Swierczyna, A. (2019). “Emerging voluntary cooperation between European healthcare systems: Are we facing 
a new future?” Medicine Access@ Point of Care, 3, 2399202619852317. 
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Importantly, in addition to the impact on payer’s budget, NPT will have an implication on patient 
access, possible leading to access delays (or even to no access at all) in some markets as predicted 
by economic theory.89 On this aspect, the computational model finds that an NPT policy not only 
delays market access in lower-income countries but also has a negative impact on middle-income 
countries.90 We will cover more extensively the implications of access delays for patients in Chapter 
5. 
 
                                                 
89  Towse, A., Pistollato, M., Mestre-Ferrandiz, J., Khan, Z., Kaura, S., & Garrison, L. (2015). “European Union pharmaceutical 
markets: a case for differential pricing?” International Journal of the Economics of Business, 22(2): 263–275. 
90  Van Dyck, W., Riccaboni, M., & Swoboda, T. 2020. Pharmaceutical net price transparency across European markets: Insights 
from a Multi-Agent simulation model, Vlerick Policy Paper Series #13. Brussels, Belgium: Healthcare Management Centre, 
Vlerick Business School. 
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4. The impact of NPT on the functioning of the market for innovative 
medicines 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Greater NPT would facilitate a shift away from value-based pricing mechanisms 
and exacerbate the impact of international reference pricing (IRP). 
• In order to achieve ‘de facto’ confidential discounts, pricing mechanisms that are 
not subject to NPT could be misused, which not only would be inefficient but also 
would disadvantage markets lacking the infrastructure and experience to facilitate 
their implementation. 
• Public net prices are likely to reduce competition amongst sellers, potentially 
raising prices of new medicines in Europe. 
• Greater NPT could reduce market attractiveness for investments. 
 
4.1. Greater NPT would alter the way in which pricing mechanisms are applied 
Across European markets, payers use four main methods of controlling pharmaceutical prices: 
pricing negotiations, the use of value assessment and cost-effectiveness, reference pricing, and 
(rarely, some form of) profit controls. In reality, most systems are a form of hybrid using a number of 
different methods. As pharmaceutical pricing is a national competence, European countries take 
very different approaches. It is also worth noting that some markets use different methods for 
different medicines (for example, one method for orphan medicines and another for non-orphan 
medicines).91  
Greater NPT is expected to alter the way in which these different pricing mechanisms are used. The 
effect on each pricing mechanism is expected to be different (Table 15): for example, greater NPT 
is expected to facilitate a shift away from value-based pricing mechanisms that rely heavily on HTA 
and lead instead to IRP mechanisms. Experts on the advisory board also highlighted that this could 
result in a situation where payers choose to determine innovative medicine prices based on 
whichever method allows them to achieve greater price reductions. In this situation, prices are 
decided without considering the value of a medicine and without transparency on the factors 
influencing the decision-making process. Additionally, this increased reliance on IRP ignores the 
specific value that one product can have in an individual country that may be different from the value 
in others (e.g. an anti-infective that is used in reserve in one market but needed earlier in the 
treatment paradigm in another due to higher epidemiology of resistant infections, or a product used 
to treat a genetic disease that is of higher prevalence in some geographies). 
The conclusion that NPT will influence the way in which pricing mechanisms work is also supported 
by results from the payer survey. Under the assumption that greater NPT would be mandated at the 
European level and incorporated into European legislation, a significant majority of survey 
                                                 
91  Mrazek, M. F. (2002). “Comparative Approaches to Pharmaceutical Price Regulation in the European Union”. Public Health, 
43(2): 453-461. 
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respondents (11/16 respondents) indicated that they would expect their own pricing and 
reimbursement process to be updated to accommodate this change in legislation at the European 
level (i.e. to make the most of the now transparent price agreements being made in other European 
markets).92 
Table 15: Expected effect of greater NPT on the use of common pricing mechanisms 
Target Expected effect of greater NPT 
Effect on 




With greater NPT, the reliance of markets on IRP for setting 
medicine prices is expected to increase based on the increased level 
of price information available. Experts also agreed that markets 
currently using IRP as just a part of their price setting strategy may 
start to put more emphasis on IRP mechanisms, especially when it 
helps them to achieve lower prices. 
Effect on 




Markets that only use HTA to determine prices (Sweden and the UK) 
are expected to continue using the same methods to determine 
prices. What may change is the impact that these value-based prices 
have on price setting in other markets. 
▼ 
Decrease 
With greater NPT, and the assumption that all markets wish to 
achieve the lowest prices possible, in markets that use both IRP and 
HTA to set prices, the importance of HTAs is expected to decrease 
given that value-based pricing is not expected to give markets the 
lowest price possible. 
Effect on 





In the context of greater NPT, confidential discounts will not be 
possible.  
Source: CRA Expert Advisory Board 
 
Given the variation in the ways in which the different pricing mechanisms are used across markets, 
the changes introduced by greater NPT are expected to impact markets in different ways. Very few 
markets rely solely on one type of pricing mechanism (for example, Poland uses cost-effectiveness 
calculations as just one part of its several-step price calculation method, and France only uses IRP 
mechanisms when drugs are granted an ASMR III 93 or above); however, almost all European 
                                                 
92  CRA Payer Survey. Question: “If increased net price transparency was introduced in Europe, would you expect the pricing 
and reimbursement process in your market to be updated to accommodate this change in legislation?” 
93  An ASMR (Amélioration du Service Médical Rendu / Improvement of the Medical Benefit) is granted by the French clinical 
assessors; an ASMR III is considered a relatively high ASMR rating (the scale goes from I (highest) to V (lowest)) and the 
referencing of other markets pricing in this instance considered a ‘reward’ versus the usual price negotiation process 
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markets (with the exception of the UK and Sweden94) use IRP mechanisms to some extent to inform 
price setting processes:  
• Focusing first on markets that do not use any IRP mechanisms to determine prices (the UK 
and Sweden): In the payer survey, payers from these markets highlighted that they expect 
greater NPT to have a lesser effect on their pricing process – it is not expected that they will 
adopt IRP due to greater NPT. However, we also need to take into account the impact of 
other countries using UK and Swedish prices. Therefore, although the UK and Sweden have 
previously acted independently, with greater NPT their influence on other markets would 
change, which could reduce their ability to negotiate prices. Given the reduced ability to use 
confidential rebates, it is likely that alternative approaches would be considered. 
• Considering markets that use some form of IRP: They will be affected differently. Some 
markets use IRP as their main pricing determinant (e.g. Austria, Bulgaria, Norway, 
Romania), and others use IRP to provide supportive information for the negotiation process 
(e.g. Italy, Poland, Spain).95 In markets that currently use a combination of HTA and IRP to 
inform (or determine) price levels, experts hypothesised scenarios where payers give 
greater or lesser importance to different mechanisms in their pricing process depending on 
what would result in a lower price. This arbitrary selection of pricing mechanisms would 
result in increased uncertainty on how pricing is determined. This builds on the observation 
above, that an increase in NPT (price transparency) may result in a decrease in pricing 
transparency (i.e. transparency on the rationale behind pricing and reimbursement 
decisions). 
Experts also theorised that with greater NPT, some European markets would attempt to form 
coalitions and cross-country collaborations to put themselves in stronger negotiating positions and 
increase their bargaining power. Already, there are examples of cross-country collaborations across 
Europe applied to HTAs, reimbursement decisions and procurement, although none are used 
consistently for all medicine approvals (e.g. the BeNeLuxA-I coalition and the Valletta Declaration 
group). In theory, these collaborations can be used to positive effect in the case of innovative 
medicines, particularly advanced therapy medicinal products (ATMPs), improving efficiency in 
assessment processes and decreasing time to access, but little empirical evidence of this currently 
exists. In an environment of greater transparency, countries could be forced to explore these 
alternative approaches more seriously as tools to gain efficient access to innovative medicines. 
4.2. Greater NPT could encourage the misuse of payment mechanisms 
Given the shared desire between payers and manufacturers to provide patients with access to 
innovative medicines, if they are not able to use confidential discounts, experts highlighted that they 
may consider other ways to gain ‘informal’ confidential discounts through arrangements that are not 
intended for this purpose, for example, MEAs. According to the definition used by the OECD, MEAs 
are “arrangements between a manufacturer and payer/provider that enable access to 
                                                 
94  Rémuzat, C., Urbinati, D., Mzoughi, O., El Hammi, E., Belgaied, W. & Toumi, M. (2015). “Overview of external reference 
pricing systems in Europe”. Journal of Market Access & Health Policy, 3:1, DOI: 10.3402/jmahp.v3.27675 
95  Rémuzat, C., Urbinati, D., Mzoughi, O., El Hammi, E., Belgaied, W. & Toumi, M. (2015). “Overview of external reference 
pricing systems in Europe”. Journal of Market Access & Health Policy, 3:1, DOI: 10.3402/jmahp.v3.27675 
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(coverage/reimbursement of) a health technology”.96 While these can be financial agreements, many 
MEAs are intended to be used to manage uncertainty regarding the clinical performance of a 
medicine, not as arrangements with the explicit objective to provide a discount on a health 
technology. The literature highlights that these types of MEAs should only be used when HTAs 
identify issues or concerns that are material to a coverage decision and traditional reimbursement 
pathways are inappropriate.97 
In the case of greater NPT, payers could look to use performance-based MEAs, such as coverage 
with evidence development (CED) agreements, to achieve an ex-post unobservable (confidential) 
discount. The original purpose of CED agreements was to provide conditional coverage to new 
technologies with limited clinical data and incentivise the collection of real world evidence (RWE) to 
provide more certainty to physicians and payers on the clinical and/or cost-effectiveness impact.98 
While the collection of RWE indeed has value in many scenarios, using such performance-based 
MEAs with the primary objective of achieving a financial discount would be against the intended 
purpose of such agreements. Furthermore, it is recognised that agreeing and implementing 
performance-based MEAs is resource intensive, due to the time required to negotiate the agreement, 
the collection of additional evidence and the future monitoring and re-assessment of the product if 
required. As a result, most stakeholders consider that MEAs are to be used only when required and 
that using such agreements in place of confidential discounts would be inefficient and could delay 
patient access. Further to this, with greater NPT, payers should be aware of the importance of 
justifying their use of MEAs, to potentially mitigate against concerns of misuse. 
Lastly, not all countries use MEAs to the same extent. Markets with a lack of infrastructure or a lack 
of experience in implementing more sophisticated payment models have less ability to (mis) use 
MEAs. Some of the key challenges associated with the implementation of MEAs include lack of 
logistical capabilities and difficulty to incorporate into inflexible reimbursement frameworks.99,100 In 
general, the implementation of MEAs requires the adoption of legal provisions allowing payers to 
use them, and their incorporation into the pricing and negotiation process (usually coupled with HTA 
methodologies to link the MEA to value and uncertainty around value). Moreover, there is a need for 
data infrastructure, requiring the establishment of patient registries and electronic patient records 
(which also require privacy protection rules and implementation of a recording system compliant with 
the European General Data Protection Regulation, GDPR).101 These challenges could be expected 
to be exacerbated in relatively lower-income markets, which generally have fewer resources to 
support the implementation of complex agreements. Literature reviews have also shown how lower-
                                                 
96  Wenzl, M. and S. Chapman (2019). "Performance-based managed entry agreements for new medicines in OECD countries 
and EU member states: How they work and possible improvements going forward". OECD Health Working Papers, No. 115, 
OECD Publishing, Paris. Available at https://doi.org/10.1787/6e5e4c0f-en  
97  Klemp, M. and Frønsdal, K.B. (2011). “What principles should govern the use of managed entry agreements?” International 
Journal of Technology Assessment in Health Care, 27(1): 77–83.  
98  Trueman, P., Grainger, D. L., and Downs, K. E. (2010). “Coverage with Evidence Development: applications and issues”. Int 
J Technol Assess Health Care, 26(1): 79–85. DOI: 10.1017/S0266462309990882. 
99  Carbonneil,C. et al. (2009). “A common policy framework for evidence generation on promising health technologies”. 
100  Montilva,J. et al. (2016). “Adoption of Managed Entry Agreements in established and emerging markets”. 
101  CRA analysis (2018) “The experience of managed entry agreements (MEAs) in Europe”. 
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income countries are less likely to have experience in using MEAs, particularly with regard to 
performance-based MEAs, which have been primarily implemented in higher-income countries as 
they require more capacities for data collection, monitoring and evaluation. Many reports show that 
MEAs are used to a greater extent in western European markets and to a lesser extent in Central 
and Eastern European markets.102 Therefore, with greater NPT, lower-income markets would likely 
have fewer options to adopt an ‘informal’ confidential discount and subsequently be disadvantaged 
from the potential misuse of pricing mechanisms. To the extent that MEAs mitigate the negative 
impact of NPT, this supports the point that greater NPT is more likely to disadvantage lower-income-
markets. 
 
4.3. Greater NPT could adversely affect competition in the pharmaceutical 
industry  
The pharmaceutical market is unusual when compared to other industries, partly due to its focus on 
innovation and dynamic competition. There are often relatively few competitors, due to the nature of 
the products (innovative medicines) that are being sold during the period of patent protection, and 
therapeutic competition between differentiated products results in new prices falling over time to the 
benefit of payers and ultimately patients.103 Further to this, the pharmaceutical market can generally 
be considered to be a monopsony, with most of the European markets operating through a single 
payer body. The pharmaceutical industry has already been highlighted as one of the riskiest 
industries in which to invest, despite the widely held belief that it is excessively profitable,104 and it 
is likely that the impact of greater NPT will negatively affect the nature of competition within the 
industry, potentially leading to further uncertainty.  
In an environment of greater NPT, sellers will be less likely to offer a lower price to buyers, as 
negotiations with other purchasers will be affected, and because their competitors will be able to 
observe the price being offered. The consensus across the experts on the advisory board, as well 
as in the literature, was that this will reduce competition compared to today.105 And lastly, in the 
payer survey, the negative effects of greater NPT on competition were mentioned by some 
respondents: for example, one payer from Italy noted, “It [greater NPT] would disclose 
manufacturers’ market access strategies, impairing the level of competition in the arena”.106 The 
impact of competition on the decrease of prices of innovative medicines has been seen in many 
instances, most evidently in Hepatitis C, where across European markets intense competition has 
                                                 
102  Castro, H. E., Malpica-Llanos, T., Musila, R., Konduri, N., Amaris, A., Sullivan, J. And Gilmartin, C. (2019). “Sharing knowledge 
for policy action in low- and middle-income countries: A literature review of managed entry agreements”, Medicine Access @ 
Point of Care. Available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2399202619834246  
103  Roediger, A., Wilsdon, T., Haderi, A., Pendleton, K., & Azais, B. (2019). “Competition between on-patent medicines in 
Europe”. Health Policy, 123(7): 652–660. 
104  David Taylor, The Pharmaceutical Industry and the Future of Drug Development , in Pharmaceuticals in the Environment, 
2015, pp. 1–33. Available at https://pubs.rsc.org/en/content/chapterhtml/2015/bk9781782621898-00001?isbn=978-1-78262-
189-8  
105  Shaw, B., & Mestre-Ferrandiz, J. (2020). “Talkin’ About a Resolution: Issues in the Push for Greater Transparency of Medicine 
Prices”. Pharmacoeconomics, 38(2): 125–134. doi: 10.1007/s40273-019-00877-3 
106  CRA Payer Survey (2020). 
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led to sharp decreases in prices and overall spending. Payers reported declines in spending despite 
the approval and launch of new medicines, indicating lower net prices at launch (although public list 
prices remained consistent).107 Even further to this, the intense competition resulted in a new model 
of therapeutic tendering to be developed in England, requiring manufacturers to submit prices based 
on their achievable market share, resulting in further price decreases.108 
The role of transparency in competition has been examined by academic and competition 
authorities.109 Competition law has been constructed to ensure that companies do not share 
valuable information that could cause sellers to gravitate to higher prices or collusive 
arrangements.110 Especially in industries where the pre-existing level of transparency is low, 
information holds more value and therefore effects on the market upon disclosure can be 
exacerbated.111 The advisory board discussed the degree to which we could learn from other 
industries and whether increased collusion following the implementation of price transparency 
measures have been seen. Although the pharmaceutical market is different in terms of the reliance 
on dynamic competition, these lessons from other industries show how collusion is facilitated by a 
transparent market, and although lessons from other industries should be used with care, they 
should not be ignored. In fact, economists often argue that collusion is more difficult with large 
numbers of traders,112 and therefore in industries where competition is concentrated (as in the 
pharmaceutical industry) the risk of tacit collusion is increased. This has also been noted by the 
OECD, which noted that in sufficiently concentrated markets, “the competitive risks of increased 
price transparency […] have not always been sufficiently appreciated by government policy makers. 
There have been instances where government mandated increases in price transparency seemed 
to have produced higher rather than lower prices”.113 It is important to notice the role that the degree 
of market concentration plays in the negative impact of increased price transparency: In more 
competitive markets, price transparency can also deliver benefits to the consumers in terms of 
increased competition; this is been the case, for instance, with digital platforms for online 
                                                 
107  Roediger, A., Wilsdon, T., Haderi, A., Pendleton, K. and Azais, B. (2019). “Competition between on-patent medicines in 
Europe”. Available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168851019301289  
108  Hawkes, N. (2019). “NHS England finalises procurement to eliminate hepatitis C”. Available at 
https://www.bmj.com/content/365/bmj.l1994.short  
109  Austin, A. & Gravelle, J. (2007). “Does Price Transparency Improve Market Efficiency? Implications of Empirical Evidence in 
Other Markets for the Health Sector”. Congressional Research Service. 
110  Shaw, B., & Mestre-Ferrandiz, J. (2020). “Talkin’ About a Resolution: Issues in the Push for Greater Transparency of Medicine 
Prices”. Pharmacoeconomics, 38(2): 125–134. doi: 10.1007/s40273-019-00877-3 
111  European Commission. Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
to horizontal cooperation agreements. Communication from the Commission, 2011/C 11/01. 2011. p. 17. https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52011XC0114(04)  . 
112  Austin, A., & Gravelle, J. (2007). Does Price Transparency Improve Market Efficiency? Implications of Empirical Evidence in 
Other Markets for the Health Sector. Congressional Research Service. 
113  OECD (2001). “Price transparency”. Policy Roundtables DAFFE/CLP(2001)22 11 September 2001. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/2535975.pdf  
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purchases.114 However, in industries facing a certain degree of market concentration (such as the 
innovative pharmaceutical industry), experience has shown that greater NPT can facilitate collusive 
behaviours, ultimately leading to higher prices.115,116,117,118,119 
4.4. Greater NPT could affect decision-making regarding international 
investments 
According to experts, political decisions to increase the level of price transparency could also send 
a negative signal to national and international investors and influence the location of future 
investments. This effect would be provoked by the operationalisation of increased price transparency 
and the implications this can have on existing contracts, in both economic and legal terms. In 
economic terms, introduction of greater transparency would challenge the commercial value of 
existing procurement contracts: it would create an artificial differentiation between prices negotiated 
before and after transparency. There would also be questions on whether prices in older contracts 
should be updated to reflect the new transparency rules and to ensure fair therapeutic competition 
with products launched after the introduction of greater NPT. This would increase the uncertainty for 
the commercialisation of products, potentially destabilising market access pathways.120 In legal 
framework terms, manufacturers may face a situation where they would be requested to disclose the 
net prices in markets where these are protected by confidential agreements with the local payers. In 
this circumstance, the delegitimisation of existing contracts would negatively affect the strength of 
the legal environment in the country implementing greater NPT, making it a riskier location for 
investments.121 Overall, the lack of attention to how greater NPT can destabilise the incentives for 
innovation, and policymakers failing to recognise these implications for the pharmaceutical industry, 
would reduce a country’s credibility, ultimately impacting the attractiveness of a market as a 
destination for investments.122 
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In addition, if NPT affects product availability it could the adversely affect the possibility of conducting 
clinical trials in some of the European markets.123 In this case, the latest innovations may not be 
available to patients (at least for a period of time) as ‘standard of care’ treatment for their condition. 
Consequently, other pharmaceutical manufacturers would be unable to conduct clinical trials in those 
countries that do not have access to the latest innovations which should be used as standard of care 
for the control arm of the trials.124,125 
                                                 
123  This topic is extensively discussed in the next chapter. 
124  Ashley, M. Y., Balasubramanaiam, B., Offringa, M., & Kelly, L. E. (2018). “Reporting of interventions and ‘standard of care’ 
control arms in pediatric clinical trials: a quantitative analysis”. Pediatric Research, 84(3): 393–398. 
125  Fogel, D. B. (2018). “Factors associated with clinical trials that fail and opportunities for improving the likelihood of success: 
a review”. Contemporary clinical trials communications, 11, 156–164. 
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5. The impact of NPT on patients access to different types of 
innovative medicines 
KEY FINDINGS 
• NPT is likely to exacerbate differences in patient access rather than reduce 
inequalities. 
• The impact will vary by therapeutic area. The impact is likely to be greatest where 
value to patients and market potential vary significantly for other reasons such as 
the degree of unmet need. This is likely to increase inequality for orphan medicines 
and transformative medicines. 
 
5.1. Access delays are likely to differ across markets 
As discussed in Section 3.3, price convergence as a result of greater NPT is likely to 
disproportionately affect lower-income markets as price increases in these markets would be a 
natural consequence of potential price reductions in higher-income markets. This is likely also to 
lead to lower access in relatively lower- and middle-price countries, which can be explained in 
different ways: 
• Diminished use of differential pricing. The ability to offer differential prices across markets is 
seen as critical for improving access to medicines.126 
• Or simply, that relatively lower-income countries will face higher prices, and given limited 
national resources dedicated to health, this will limit access to innovative medicines. 
Consistent with economic theory, price convergence is expected to lead to access delays and 
potentially fewer product launches, especially in lower-income markets.127,128 This arises due to IRP 
and the impact IRP has on the strategic behaviour of the industry. In some cases payers will decide 
to delay price negotiations until prices in other markets are available, and in others the use of IRP 
provides incentives to manufacturers to launch drugs in an order that will protect their prices.129,130 
                                                 
126  Yadav, P. for The U.K. Department for International Development (DFID), (2010). “Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: 
Review of current knowledge, new findings and ideas for action”. Available at http://hsrii.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/diff-
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128  Shaw, B., & Mestre-Ferrandiz, J. (2020). “Talkin’ About a Resolution: Issues in the Push for Greater Transparency of Medicine 
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Further, markets may also use access delays as a negotiation lever to reduce prices (the value of a 
drug decreases the closer it gets to its patent expiry date).131 Experts highlighted that with greater 
NPT, price convergence (leading to increased prices especially in lower-income markets) and 
increased dependence on IRP mechanisms could exacerbate access delays. As a result, patients in 
lower-income markets are likely to incur greater access delays for medicines than they do currently. 
A larger proportion of payers questioned in the survey indicated they would expect slower access to 
medicines (n = 5), whereas just one respondent indicated they would expect faster access (Figure 
11). Many payers also indicated they would not expect any change in current access (n = 5) even 
when they did expect there to be changes to the prices. In particular, payers in Germany explicitly 
stated that they would not expect access to be delayed at all since immediate access (during the 
free pricing period) is a “cornerstone of drug policy in Germany”.132  
Figure 11: Payers were undecided as to the impact of greater NPT on access but did not 
believe access would improve 
 
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020) 
The delay also occurs because of the impact on budgets and the strategic behaviour of payers. In 
markets where prices are expected to increase (lower-income markets currently paying lower prices 
and markets achieving significant confidential discounts compared to the highest-income / highest-
price markets), it may not be possible for payers to agree to this higher price for a medicine, but it 
also may not be possible for the industry to sustainably offer a lower price due to the potential IRP 
implications in an environment of NPT.133 This may mean that pricing agreements in lower-income 
markets are not able to be reached, resulting in a delay to access for several years until price erosion 
over time has brought the convergent European price to a level where they are able to pay. Figure 
12 shows, in a simplistic and illustrative way, how offering different prices to markets with different 
budget constraints allows all markets to afford a product according to their ability to pay. In the case 
of price convergence, only one market can afford the price and therefore markets with stronger 
                                                 
131  CRA Expert Advisory Board (2020). 
132  CRA Payer Survey (2020). 
133  Van Dyck, W., Riccaboni, M., & Swoboda, T. 2020. Pharmaceutical net price transparency across European markets: Insights 
from a Multi-Agent simulation model, Vlerick Policy Paper Series #13. Brussels, Belgium: Healthcare Management Centre, 
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budget constraints will find themselves now unable to afford drugs and will see forced delays to 
access. 
Figure 12: Price convergence means that countries with more stringent budget constraints 
will be kept out of the market and see increased delays to access 
 
Illustrative representation: an accurate economic representation would consider additional market characteristics and 
dynamics (e.g. price elasticities, costs structure, price formation mechanism). However, the outcome from Situation 2 (i.e. no 
access in country B) represents an actual outcome that is possible under given circumstances. 
Source: CRA 
 
5.2. Access delays are more likely for innovative products 
The payer survey explored whether payers had different expectations about the impact of greater 
NPT on price and access of three different products in three different therapy areas (TAs) (Figure 
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13). In most cases answers remained consistent, indicating minimal expected changes in access 
across the three therapy areas.134  
Figure 13: Three products in three TAs were explored during the payer survey 
Source: CRA Payer Survey (2020) 
 
Experts on the advisory board additionally highlighted that while the three scenarios were different, 
each of the hypothetical products still represented a significant innovation, hence the similar 
expectations about price and access implications. Experts suggested instead that if the difference 
between the level of innovation of the three products was more pronounced, there would be 
significant differences in the impact on both price and access. Namely that with greater NPT, the 
more innovative products would likely be subject to longer access delays.135  
We consider the most innovative products and the products facing more therapeutic competition in 
turn. For the most innovative products, it is likely that value varies across countries. This outcome 
could depend on diagnostic structure or centres of excellence that do not exist in lower-income 
countries (hence the value delivered can be higher in markets with more advanced infrastructures). 
The volumes in the lower-income markets are also likely to be very small relative to the sales in 
higher-income countries. So, any impact of NPT will be exacerbated (given the commercial 
incentives to secure access in the higher-value / higher-volume markets). In this case, we might 
expect NPT to have a very strong impact on patient access, increasing the significant differences in 
access we already observe today.  
If products are in a more mature class with competing products, we might expect the price difference 
between the higher- and lower-income countries to be smaller, reflecting the impact of competition 
in the higher-income countries and the increased bargaining power of the purchaser. Given that the 
differences in value across countries might be less pronounced, as it is less reliant on investment in 
the healthcare infrastructure, we would expect the impact on NPT to be less. The impact of any delay 
                                                 
134  CRA Payer Survey (2020). 
135  CRA Expert Advisory Board (2020). 
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on lower-income countries will also be smaller, as there are a number of different products that can 
be used to serve patient needs. 
This argument can be extended further. If we consider off-patent medicines, we would like prices to 
be determined by competition, with the result that prices should reflect the cost of these medicines. 
If competition works less well in some markets than others, NPT could share information on the price 
of off-patent medicines where it works effectively. In fact, some literature goes so far as to say that 
price transparency and uniformity could be beneficial in the generic drug market as this would 
encourage prices to reflect unit costs across markets.136  
 
5.3. Greater NPT could affect the development of new medicines 
While the overall effects of greater NPT on industry revenues are hard to predict in the long term 
(and represent the mirror impact of national budgets discussed in Chapter 3), it is clear that NPT 
links different markets more closely together. The investment in innovative medicines is long and 
risky and involves companies anticipating how price and reimbursement systems will evolve across 
countries and regions – increased uncertainty will affect decision-making on long-term 
investments.137  
The experts on the advisory board warned of the implications of looking at NPT only through a 
European lens. If we consider the global breakdown of sales of the pharmaceutical market in 2019, 
European sales accounted for 22.9% of global sales, 48.7% came from the US and Canada, 7.2% 
from Japan and the remainder from the rest of the world.138 In reality, these markets are already 
interconnected. Many markets reference European list prices to set their own medicine prices (e.g. 
Australia, Canada, Japan) and others are discussing implementing such rules (e.g. the US). With 
greater NPT, the prices agreed in European markets could have a greater impact on global 
pharmaceutical sales, especially if the US proceeds to implement IRP of European net prices.139 It 
is also important to consider that if prices in Europe influence the prices in other markets, particularly 
the US, this could have a significant impact on willingness to negotiate prices in Europe and could 
affect access to medicines. Greater European NPT could firstly increase the risk of reducing 
revenues available for R&D investment, harming patients all over the world from a health outcomes 
perspective. Alternatively, in order to maintain current private sector R&D investment levels, 
European markets could see higher prices, thus harming payers through higher prices and/or 
patients through reduced access to treatment. Again, this is likely to impact the most novel medicines 
to the greatest extent. 
                                                 
136  Kyle, M.K. & Ridley, D.B. (2007). “Would Greater Transparency and Uniformity of Health Care prices Benefit Poor Patients?”. 
Health Affairs, 26 (5): 1384–1391. DOI 10.1377/hlthaff.26.5.1384 
137  Al-Thaqeb, S. A. and Algharabali, B. G. (2019). “Economic policy uncertainty: A literature review”. The Journal of Economic 
Asymmetries. 
138  EFPIA (2020). “The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures: Key Data”. Available at 
https://www.efpia.eu/media/554521/efpia_pharmafigures_2020_web.pdf  
139  US Government website (2019). “Lower Prescription Drug Costs Now”. Available at: 
https://www.speaker.gov/sites/speaker.house.gov/files/HR3%20Backgrounder%2010.2.19.pdf  
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• The NPT debate (and other transparency debates) are largely politicised; greater 
consideration should be given to the likely impact of policy changes on society 
based on economic theory and literature evidence. 
• Greater NPT in Europe is likely to have negative consequences for patients, payers’ 
budgets and the functioning of the market for innovative biopharmaceuticals. 
• Greater NPT in Europe must also be considered in the wider context of the policy 
in other key markets, in particular in markets that reference (or plan to reference) 
European prices.  
In this report we have tried to document evidence on the impact of NPT. It draws on a literature 
review, a survey of European payers, an advisory board of economic experts representing many 
European countries, and a new economic simulation model. It is clear that greater NPT will not have 
a uniform impact across countries but has the potential to cause unintended negative consequences 
both in the short and long term for patients, payers’ budgets and the functioning of the market for 
innovative biopharmaceuticals, if implemented without stringent measures to mitigate against the 
potential risks. 
The initial ramification of price convergence upon disclosure of confidential price information (which 
is widely supported by the literature and now by a robust economic simulation model) would be likely 
to result in price increases in markets that are currently paying below the European average 
(assumed to be typically lower-income markets). This will have negative impacts not only on payers 
and national budgets, particularly in lower-income markets, but also on patients through delayed 
patient access. In addition, the functioning of the market is likely to be adversely affected: the way in 
which pricing mechanisms are used is expected to change (potentially resulting in the misuse of 
some pricing mechanisms), competition could decrease, and this will increase uncertainty, 
potentially impacting innovation. 
There is divergence of the political debate on greater NPT and the technical debate on the impact of 
greater NPT as well as frequent conflation within the political debate of the principles of ‘price 
transparency’ and ‘pricing transparency’. Many stakeholders, including payers, industry, the general 
public and technical experts, recognise the value of transparency in decision-making around 
innovative medicine prices (pricing transparency). However, the impact of greater price transparency 
(i.e. greater NPT) on patients, healthcare spending and innovation needs to be taken into account.  
Whether it is possible to increase transparency, improving trust and confidence, without the negative 
consequences on patients, the healthcare system and innovation, needs careful consideration. This 
should involve a multi-stakeholder consultation process to ensure that all implications are understood 
and accounted for and appropriate mitigation strategies put in place. Experts highlighted that a key 
potential mitigation would be to have prior agreement amongst participating markets on Ramsey 
Pricing levels to ensure price differentials across participating markets are maintained. However, 
experts also stressed that reaching such agreements would be politically challenging although 
considered theoretically possible and fair through advanced discussions and strict laws to ensure 
individual states do not renegotiate lower prices upon publication of prices in other markets. 
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This concept has been typified by recent events in Italy: a legislative decree passed by the 
government calling for the disclosure of negotiated agreements was later followed by practical 
implementation guidelines from the Italian payer authority, AIFA, which subsequently accounted for 
and protected existing confidential agreements (Case study). This example shows how consideration 
of the technical ramifications of NPT is important before passing legislation that may endanger 
existing systems that are in place to ensure and protect the functioning of the biopharmaceutical 
market. 
Case study of the Italian market: AIFA’s implementation guidelines for the Pricing & 
Reimbursement Decree 
In July 2020, a Pricing & Reimbursement Decree was published in the ‘Gazzetta Ufficiale della 
Repubblica Italiana’ based on legislation approved by the previous Ministry of Health and Ministry 
of Economy and Finance. Most notably, this decree stated that the manufacturer must provide 
information about “… marketing, consumption and the reimbursement in other countries … 
including any further negotiation agreements” in order to begin the reimbursement negotiation 
process.140  
In August 2020, AIFA followed up with guidelines on how this decree is to be implemented and 
clearly upholds the confidentiality of pricing agreements made in other markets. Manufacturers 
are only requested to share negotiated discounts if these are non-confidential.141 
This reaction from AIFA to the new legislation shows that payers in Italy recognise the value of 
confidentiality and the practical limitations of calling for greater net price transparency.  
 
There are many arguing that to tackle increasing healthcare expenditure, policymakers should be 
looking not only to medicines, which accounts for approximately 17% (in 2018) of pharmaceutical 
expenditure across European markets,142 but also to inefficiencies in the system. For example, in 
Italy it was estimated that about 26% of the total healthcare expenditure is attributable to 
inefficiencies, wastages and corruption (that is, €23.6 billion in 2017, more than the double the 
expenditure on innovative pharmaceuticals).143 The OECD published a comprehensive report in 
2017 on approaches for tackling the wasteful spending on health amongst member states which can 
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143  EURISPES (2017). “Il termometro della salute”. Available at: https://eurispes.eu/ricerca-rapporto/enpam-eurispes-il-
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occur due to myriad reasons including low-value care, inappropriate medicine use, administrative 
spending, fraud corruption and other integrity violations.144 
The importance of considering the economic ramifications applies also more broadly to other 
debates around transparency. For instance, discussion of R&D costs transparency (which is often 
coupled with NPT in many policy discussions) suffers from similar issues as those highlighted for 
greater NPT: the political debate is not aligned with the technical implications (Table 16).  
Table 16: The implications of disclosing R&D costs 
Technical implications of disclosing R&D costs 
R&D cost 
disclosure 
facilitates a move 
away from value-
based healthcare 
R&D costs do not in any way reflect the value that a medicine brings to 
patients and society (R&D costs depend on the length of development, 
stringency of the approval processes, attrition rates and the cost of 
capital).145 While value-based healthcare and the way that it is 
implemented in many markets may not be the perfect medicine pricing 







If R&D costs are used to inform pricing methodologies (i.e. cost-plus 
pricing), this would present an incentive to exaggerate costs or 
disincentivise productivity and likely push research towards areas of less 
clinical development uncertainty.146,147 
Cost-plus pricing 
delegitimates HTA 
Shifting to cost-plus pricing to inform price negotiations would delegitimate 
decades of scientific developments in HTA methodologies and undermine 
the autonomy of national bodies in determining which medicines are best 
for patients. 




R&D costs for an individual medicine are considered almost impossible to 
calculate, especially given the costs associated with failed products and 
the impact that a single innovation can have across multiple medicines 
and disease areas. 
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Calculating R&D 
costs relevant to a 
single market is 
not possible 
As a global joint cost, irrespective of the number of patients benefited 
worldwide, R&D investment cannot be attributed to specific countries or 
patients.148 
 
Although this report has not considered markets outside of Europe when discussing the potential 
impacts of greater NPT, the risks associated with this policy change are no doubt exacerbated when 
considered in this broader context. In particular, current and increasing interdependency between 
European and US prices could result in a significant risk to the industry innovation model and 
patients’ access to innovative medicines today and in the future, given the share of 
biopharmaceutical revenue that the US is responsible for. Similarly, outside of the US, many other 
markets reference European prices, thereby ‘raising the stakes’ of greater NPT in Europe. 
In summary, there is a consensus across technical experts that greater NPT is a risky and inefficient 
policy proposal to address issues in the healthcare system if implemented without stringent 
measures to mitigate against risks (e.g. prior agreement of Ramsey Pricing levels amongst 
participating markets). Although some advocates theorise that prices will decrease with greater NPT, 
economic theory has shown that the picture is significantly more complex than this, with significant 
associated risks for payer budgets and a danger of having the opposite impact in many markets. 
Only by bringing together a range of stakeholders to discuss the political and technical 
consequences of transparency will we be able to develop policy proposals that improve trust while 
maintaining efficiency in healthcare decision-making and patient access. 
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